Logic, Convention, and Common Knowledge

A Conventionalist Account of Logic

Paul F. Syverson

Logic, Convention, and Common Knowledge
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Paul F. Syverson

Distributed for Center for the Study of Language and Information

166 pages | 6 x 9 | © 2002
Cloth $55.00 ISBN: 9781575863917 Published November 2002
Paper $25.00 ISBN: 9781575863924 Published November 2002
One of the fundamental theses of this book is that logical consequence and logical truth are not simply given, but arise as conventions among the users of logic. Thus Syverson explains convention within a game-theoretic framework, as a kind of equilibrium between the strategies of players in a game where they share common knowledge of events—a revisiting of Lewis's Convention that argues that convention can be reasonably treated as coordination equilibria. Most strikingly, a realistic solution is provided for Gray's classic coordination problem, wherein two generals can only communicate with each other through unreliable means.
1. Conventionalism: Setting Out the Problem
2. Games and Equilibria
3. Conventions
4. Common Knowledge and Coordination
5. Conventional Knowledge and Belief
6. The Origins of Mutual Understanding
7. A Logic of Familiarity
8. Three Grades of Epistemic Involvement
9. A Logic of Awareness
10. Convention Revisited
11. Conventions in Logic
For more information, or to order this book, please visit http://www.press.uchicago.edu
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