Imperfect Alternatives
Choosing Institutions in Law, Economics, and Public Policy
Pointing out that all three institutions are massive, complex, and imperfect, Komesar develops a strategy for comparative institutional analysis that assesses variations in institutional ability. He then powerfully demonstrates the value of this analytical framework by using it to examine important contemporary issues ranging from tort reform to constitution-making.
Pt. I: Deciding Who Decides: The Comparative Analysis of Institutional Performance
1: Taking Institutional Choice Seriously
2: Social Goals and Public Policies: Bridging the Gap between Them
Pt. II: Who Plays, Who Doesn't: The Participation-Centered Approach to the Political Process, the Market, and the Courts
3: The Political Process: The Power of the Few and the Power of the Many
4: The Market Process: Transaction Costs and Transaction Benefits
5: The Courts as an Institution: The Structure and Scale of Justice
Pt. III: Applications: Weighing the Relative Merits of Institutions
6: Safety, Tort Law, and Tort Reform
7: Constitutional Law and Constitution Making
8: American Constitutional Law: The Contours of Judicial Review
9: Summary and Conclusion: Propositions Audiences, and Reformations
Author Index
Subject Index
Economics and Business: Economics--General Theory and Principles
Law and Legal Studies: General Legal Studies | Law and Economics
Political Science: Public Policy
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