59 • Colonial Cartography under the Tudor and Early Stuart Monarchies, ca. 1480–ca. 1640

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INTRODUCTION

Geographical maps were crucial to English transoceanic ventures during the Tudor (1485–1603) and early Stuart (1603–49) monarchies. Those ventures depended upon, and in turn supplied, an active discussion about the nature of the world and of the place of England therein. The mapping of colonies served to create a particular identity of the still-heterogenous English as an imperial, or perhaps more properly as a proto-imperial, nation. At the same time, such mapping contributed to a developing map consciousness within English political and mercantile classes. This chapter accordingly examines not the various voyages and endeavors themselves but the manner in which geographical maps—both manuscript and printed—underpinned English overseas activities.1

Despite the apparent implications of a very few works with titles such as John Speed’s 1611 atlas, The Theatre of the Empire of Great Britain, there was little about this early period that bore any resemblance to the British empires of either the eighteenth or nineteenth centuries. Throughout this period, the English used “empire” in the original, Roman sense of imperium—that is, sovereignty or the right to rule—and not to mean a territorially expansive political entity. The Roman concept of Britannia was reborn when, to the affront of many Englishmen, James VI of Scotland (r. 1587–1625) christened his new composite monarchy “Great Britain” after his accession in 1603 to the English throne as James I; this, and only this, was the entity addressed by Speed with his atlas. Nor was there any common sense of “Britishness.” 2 Thus English mapmakers did not indicate territorial claims by displaying James’s new, complex “Union flag” on their maps; rather, they continued to use either the royal coat of arms (see figs. 59.6, 59.12, and 59.13) or the English cross of St. George (see fig. 59.5).

Most of the English transoceanic voyaging and colonization efforts during the sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries were driven by that small portion of surplus wealth generated by the merchants of London—and, to a much lesser degree, of the ports in the West Country—that was not reinvested in domestic or European trade. Some activities were financed by surpluses generated by family lands, notably by Sir Walter Ralegh. The transoceanic endeavors took one of two forms. On the one hand, merchants came together in small consortia or in large, joint-stock, monopoly crown-chartered companies to undertake long-distance trade, to provide both exotic commodities for English desires left unfulfilled by shifting trade patterns in Europe and new markets for England’s primary export commodity, woollen cloth. On the other hand, adventurers and less conservative speculators advanced grandiose and overtly colonial schemes in specific emulation of the colonial successes of the Spanish, even as they decried the atrocities perpetrated by the Spanish on the indigenous peoples of the Americas. Both kinds of endeavor required political support from and licensing by the crown to reassure investors and legitimize territorial ambitions. Despite this similar dependency, contemporary Englishmen understood the two avenues of overseas activity to be distinct: the Asian and African trades dealt in products long available in England and so was seen as an extension of older practices, but with added opportunities for slave trading, whereas the westward expeditions to the Americas, with all their innovativeness and opportunities


1. For the role of marine charting in colonial activities, see also chapter 58 in this volume.

for plunder, land, and mining, as well as for trade and religious proselytizing, constituted “overseas ventures” per se. Indeed, there was a marked legal difference between the monopolies granted to the trading companies and the Letters Patent that, under European law, crucially permitted Englishmen to exploit, in the name of the monarch, any transoceanic discoveries beyond the realm of any Christian monarch.

Actual interest in overseas endeavors, of both sorts, waxed and waned in England according to the state of the economy and the willingness of the crown and its ministers to support and encourage such ventures in the light of European politics. Generally impoverished and repeatedly beset by internal political and religious upheavals, the crown could not involve itself directly in overseas and colonial ventures. As a result, English overseas ventures were always far less organized and far worse controlled than those of the Iberians, Dutch, and French. Eventually, it was the ideological dispute with Catholic Spain after 1550 that led some Englishmen in court and mercantile circles to advocate direct competition with the Spanish in the Americas.

After 1603, the crown’s policy of cultivating peace with the Spanish led to a resurgent emphasis on colonial and mercantile ventures in North America and the Caribbean, beyond Spanish interests, which provided the occasion of the first successful English colonial settlement in the New World. It is nonetheless salutary to bear in mind Andrew’s argument that, in this period, actual colonization always held a much lower priority for the English than did trade and plunder. As a result, in the forty-five years between 1603 and Charles I’s death in 1649, English migration to the New World amounted only to about 40,000 persons (split equally between New England and the colonies in Virginia, Maryland, and the West Indies). By comparison, approximately 100,000 Scottish, English, and Welsh migrants settled in Ireland and approximately 360,000 people moved to London during the same period. Such low levels of colonization in the New World had only a minor territorial impact and so led to relatively few detailed mapping episodes—each Letters Patent entailed the delimitation of boundaries through legally binding textual descriptions rather than malleable graphic maps—especially in comparison to the contemporary colonial cartographers of the Spanish and Portuguese.

Despite their differences, these various sets of overseas activities—mercantile or colonial, before or after 1603—relied upon an active intellectual and conceptual engagement with the world through geographical texts and cartographic images. Such geographical texts sought to set the English on a moral par with the Spanish and other rival powers. Central to all these geographical texts were the maps that envisioned and shaped the idea of English colonialism and that were eventually used to transform the Elizabethan “paper empire” into a real economy under the early Stuarts.

**Maps and the Promotion of Overseas Ventures under the Early Tudor Monarchs**

The first English voyages westward into the Atlantic were commercial ventures undertaken independently of the crown. Competition with the Hanseatic League in the Icelandic cod trade probably led consortia of Bristol merchants to underwrite two unsuccessful voyages in 1480 and 1481; their goal was to establish fishing bases on the fabled Island of Brasil, far to the west of Ireland. Another fishing expedition was perhaps sent out in the mid-1490s and possibly made landfall in Newfoundland. Soon thereafter, John Cabot led three westward voyages from Bristol in 1496–98. Cabot was an adventurous mariner who in

7. This point has most recently been argued by Christopher Tomlins, “The Legal Cartography of Colonization, the Legal Polyphony of Settlement: English Intrusions on the American Mainland in the Seventeenth Century,” *Law and Social Inquiry* 26 (2001): 315–72.
March 1496 persuaded Henry VII to endorse a scheme to surpass Christopher Columbus's initial success by establishing a more northerly and so shorter route to the riches of the Indies, which were to be conquered and plundered.9

When Cabot returned from his first successful voyage—successful in that he had reached land to the north of that previously encountered by Columbus, thereby demonstrating the apparent feasibility of a short-cut to the Indies—he attended on Henry VII at Westminster in December 1497. According to the Milanese ambassador, Cabot had “the description of the world in a map, and also in a solid sphere, which he has made, and shows where he has been.” This map and globe did not impress the court as an authentic record of the voyage; corroboration for Cabot’s account came only from the eye-witness accounts of the English who had sailed with him from Bristol and who now wished to return for the fishing to this new-found land. The maps did, however, support Cabot’s own argument for the ease of voyaging still further to “Cipango, situated in the equinoctial region, where . . . all the spices in the world have their origin, as well as the jewels.” Indeed, the maps helped make “everything so plain” that not only did the ambassador “feel compelled to believe” Cabot but the king also agreed to help equip and man a further expedition that, if successful, would “make London a more important mart for spices than Alexandria.”10 That is to say, Cabot’s maps probably conceptualized the world in a manner similar to several surviving maps from the period—perhaps Juan de la Cosa’s manuscript world map of 1500 (see fig. 30.9), which provides the only direct cartographic record of Cabot’s voyage, Johannes Ruysch’s world map of 1508 (see fig. 42.7), and others—which all depict what we know today as Newfoundland and Cape Breton as the northeasternmost promontories of Asia.11 Cabot’s cartographic argument was sufficiently powerful to outlive his disappearance on his next voyage in 1498: Henry would grant another patent for an overseas venture to a joint Bristol-Azores consortium in 1501.12

Royal support for westward enterprises from Bristol evaporated under Henry VIII (r. 1509–47), especially when their principal promoter, John Cabot’s son Sebastian, left for Spain in June 1516. Robert Thorne accordingly complained, in a 1527 letter to the English ambassador in Spain and to Cardinal Thomas Wolsey (lord chancellor, 1515–29), that had Cabot’s discoveries been exploited “the lands of the West Indies from whence all the gold cometh” would already have been in the possession of the English; his argument rested in large part on the cartographic evidence of a world map—“as by the Carde appeareth”—but it did not entice further attention from the crown.13 Toward the end of Henry’s reign, however, Jean Rotz successfully sought royal patronage when he presented two works to Henry, his Boke of Idrography and a treatise on the compass. Rotz’s atlas shows that he was well attuned to the commercial opportunities in the Orient and South Atlantic, opportunities that, it is thought, he had explored himself between 1525 and 1533.14

Under Edward VI (r. 1547–53) and Mary I (r. 1553–58), such an appreciation gained new adherents among the Privy Council. John Dudley (lord high admiral, 1543–53) proposed, for example, that an English colony be founded to control the mineral wealth of “Peru,” which is to say South America.15 Moreover, the Council enticed Sebastian Cabot to return to England in 1547 with a com-
mission to work toward establishing the Northeast Passage to Asia. Cabot retained a particular interest in pursuing the Northwest Passage—to which end he had Clement Adams engrave in 1549 his now lost world map, to highlight the northern passages and the “Baccalaos,” or codfish shore of Labrador—but he nonetheless embraced the issue of eastern trade. Cabot was instrumental in the formation in 1553 of a short-lived Cathay Company to explore the Northeast Passage; although the company soon failed, the contact it made with Russia led to the formation of the Muscovy Company in 1555. Until his death in 1557, Cabot also provided navigational and cartographic expertise to the company, arguing for the liberal provision of charts to the company’s captains. Among other people, Cabot trained Stephen Borough who would sail regularly for Russia and who in 1562 complained to Lord Burghley that the underlying constraint preventing English seamen from doing more in a colonial vein was their obvious navigational and cartographic incompetence.

**THE “PAPER EMPIRE” OF ELIZABETH I (r. 1558–1603)**

The profits generated by the Muscovy Company, although still limited, led a persistent interest in extracting wealth from overseas ventures to take root during the 1560s and 1570s. The Northeast Passage remained a focus of endeavor, although its feasibility would be disproved by the difficulties encountered by Charles Jackman and Arthur Pet in 1583. In the southern Atlantic, English mariners became increasingly aggressive as they began to privatise and as they tried to force their way into the African slave trade. To the north and west, the lowly, staple trade of the Newfoundland cod fishery was taken over and expanded by well-capitalized merchants from Devon, who reawakened Cabot’s and Thorne’s visions of Devon, who reawakened Cabot’s and Thorne’s visions of a route to Asia, now configured as the Northwest Passage. Martin Frobisher was able to garner enough support to undertake a voyage to explore the Northwest Passage in 1576. His putative discovery of gold in the Arctic, together with the sharply escalating conflict with Spain over religion, would encourage a spate of proposals for overseas ventures from English merchants and adventurers.

These proposals routinely employed geographical maps to visualize their goals. As George Best would write in 1578, in praise of early English explorers, together with his own highly schematic world map (fig. 59.1):

> By this discourse and Mappe, is to be seene the valiant courages of men in this later age, within these 80 yeares, that have so muche enlarged the boundes of the Worlde, that now we have twice and thricse so muche scope for our earthlie peregrination, as we have had in times past, so that nowe men may no more contentently striv e for roome to build a house on, or for a little turffe of . . . one acre or two, when greate Countries, and whole Worldes, offer and reache out themselves, to them that will first voucsafe to possesse, inhabe, and till them.

World maps offered a vision of unlimited space into which the English could expand. They constructed a “paper empire.”

The role of maps as rhetorically powerful devices that drove English interest in overseas ventures can be seen in two events in particular. In 1568, the then sixteen-year-old Richard Hakluyt was inspired to make geography and cosmography his life’s study by the exposition by his elder cousin and namesake of a world map, perhaps Abraham Ortelius’s 1564 cordiform map. Slightly earlier, in 1566,
Sir Humphrey Gilbert had written to his brother John, arguing against the feasibility of the Northeast Passage and for the ease of a Northwest Passage; for his brother’s “better understanding,” Gilbert attached “a rough draught” of “a universall Map” derived from Ortelius’s 1564 map. Both letter and map were published in 1576 by George Gascoigne to promote Frobisher’s expedition to the Northwest Passage. Gilbert’s map strongly reinforced his argument, clearly labeling the crucial places identified in his text and depicting a Northeast Passage seemingly blocked by land, whereas North America extended only to 50°N latitude, leaving open seas for the mariner (fig. 59.2).25

Frobisher himself was aided in conceptualizing the Northwest Passage by John Dee. Dee moved easily between London merchants and Westminster courtiers, advising on all matters mathematical and philosophical. He had, in particular, advised the Muscovy Company on cartographic matters since Cabot’s death in 1557.26 For Frobisher and his backers among the London merchants, particularly Michael Lok, the Muscovy Company’s London agent, Dee drew on a variety of maps, such as the map of the North Atlantic and the Americas in André Thevet’s 1575 La cosmographie universelle, to establish the feasibility of a Northwest Passage.27 At the same time, Dee also

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published an argument for the establishment of a marine empire, to be competitive with the Spanish, and funded by the extraction of precious metals from Asia rather than the Americas, although the work had a very small circulation. Frobisher first sailed to explore the Northwest Passage to fabled Cathay in 1576. En route, he discovered what he took to be gold deposits on what was quickly named Meta Incognita, the “unknown limit” or “unknown shore.” This discovery focused English energies—crown and merchant alike—on North America not as an obstacle to get around but a resource to be exploited.

Dee and his maps were instrumental in creating a new imperial vision. He gave several presentations in 1577 and 1578 on the subject of overseas endeavors to Elizabeth I and her ministers, in the process coining the phrase “British Empire.” “British” in this sense was a function not of a unified English and Scottish identity but rather of the supposed precursors of the English nation—and especially the mythical voyager, Prince Madoc—who Dee claimed had discovered and even occupied portions of North America, thereby establishing rights to territory which the English were now entitled to “recover.” Dee summarized those territorial claims in a map he prepared in about 1580 (fig. 59.3); on its verso, he tabulated the territories with their legal precedents, including the voyages of Frobisher and Sir Francis Drake (1577–80). In addition to Frobisher’s Northwest Enterprise,” in Meta Incognita, 1:283–98. Frobisher’s May 1576 provisioning accounts included the acquisition of “a book of Cosmografie in frenche of Andreas Thevet makinge,” and “a newe world of Andreas Thevett englishe and Frenche books ij smalle,” together with other maps and globes; TNA, E164/35/16.


tion to such sparse maps, highlighting George Best’s vision of how “greate Countries, and whole Worldes, offer and reach out themselves,” Dee also provided more overtly symbolic maps. His record of his presentations to Elizabeth suggests that he once incorporated the image of the queen within a world map—relating different places to different parts of Elizabeth’s body—in a manner perhaps akin to Vicente de Memije’s superimposition of a virgin queen over the Spanish empire in a map of 1761, to symbolize Elizabeth’s sovereign rights to Asian and American territories.30

Frobisher led two more voyages to Meta Incognita in 1577 and 1578—the last with a fleet of no fewer than fifteen ships—to exploit the putative gold deposits. Given the potential significance of those deposits in Meta Incognita, it is understandable that the Privy Council restricted the dissemination of the maps generated by Frobisher’s voyages. In November 1578, for example, the council directed their commissioners “to demaunde” of the participants in Frobisher’s voyages “suche plattes of description of the places as they had made, and to forbyd them and others to publishe any description of those countres.” The cartographic products of Frobisher’s voyages, such as Christopher Hall’s augmentation of William Borough’s manuscript chart of the far North Atlantic, were to be restricted to the council and its designated commissioners.31


Thus Best could include in his published account of Frobisher’s voyages a “particular Card” that depicted Meta Incognita only so far “as the secrets of the voyage may permit.”  32 Not that the Privy Council was successful in keeping a tight rein on the maps: charts as well as ore samples acquired by the Spanish ambassador arrived in Madrid in February 1579, hidden in a specially designed silver chalice.  33 The Privy Council was only marginally more successful after 1580 in trying to obfuscate Drake’s explorations on his circumnavigation and his claim to “New Albion.” The council interfered significantly over the publication of an account of Drake’s voyage in Hakluyt’s Principal Navigations (1589), requiring it to appear on specially printed pages and for it to be omitted from both the contents list and index; Hakluyt received a detailed account of Drake’s circumnavigation in January 1593, but it was not published, together with a world map, until 1628.  34 It should be remembered, however, that the Privy Council could not establish the sort of uniform provisions for security or, for that matter, of cartographic standards, sometimes achieved by the Spanish, the Portuguese, and (later) the Dutch.

The eventual realization that Frobisher had not in fact found gold did not put a damper on English ambitions. Francis Drake’s circumnavigation—ostensibly intended to scout for likely sites for colonization in South America—produced not only the first direct English contact with the East Indies but also a great deal of plunder from Spanish America and so stimulated English ambitions. For example, Dee reflected on Gilbert’s continued fixation on a Northwest Passage, as opposed to the Northeast Passage, and on the potential mineral wealth of North America in a map he prepared for Gilbert in about 1582; note that this map included two routes around or through North America from the Atlantic to the Pacific (see fig. 30.1).  35 Gilbert had received permission from Elizabeth to colonize Newfoundland, in return for a quarter of all the gold and silver Gilbert found there, and Gilbert had in turn granted Dee a large tract of land. After Gilbert died in 1583, his half-brother Sir Walter Ralegh took up the idea of a large colonizing effort and famously commissioned two undercapitalized and thus unsuccessful attempts (in 1585–86 and 1587–90) to establish the Virginia colony at Roanoke.  36

Like previous principal advocates of colonization, Ralegh was part of a circle of like-minded courtiers, merchants, and scholars, from whom he drew advice and support.  37 Prominent among these was Richard Hakluyt, who has received much attention from historians because of his role as a leading proponent of English colonization in the Elizabethan era.  38 Hakluyt was, however, more at home with written than with cartographic accounts of the voyages: Skelton observed that Hakluyt’s writings “yield surprisingly few traces of the intensive and critical collation of maps habitually undertaken by some of [his] English contemporaries,” such as Dee, Ralegh himself, or Lord Burghley.  39 Thus, for Divers Voyages, his 1582 collection of documents relating to the discovery of America and its

32. Best, True Discourse, title page. For Best’s regional map, see Baldwin, “Testing a New Academic Trinity,” 75–76.
R. Samuel Bawlf, Sir Francis Drake’s Secret Voyage to the Northwest Coast of America, AD 1579 (Salt Spring Island, B.C.: Sir Francis Drake Publications, 2001), skillfully, if controversially, added a lot of literary and cartographic evidence (alongside some unconfirmed archaeological presumptions) to suggest that the colonial element of the circumnavigation was successfully kept secret by the Privy Council until 1642.
northern islands, Hakluyt included only two schematic maps to rehearse the possibilities of the northern passages: Robert Thorne’s 1527 map of both passages and Michael Lok’s map of the Northwest Passage (fig. 59.4). Moreover, the rhetorical emphasis in both maps of passing by the New World to exploit the riches of eastern Asia worked against Hakluyt’s principal intent to advocate the planting of colonies on the North American mainland. Ralegh and Sir Francis Walsingham, Elizabeth’s principal secretary, subsequently commissioned Hakluyt to prepare a “Discourse of Western Planting,” outlining the “greate necessitie” for planting colonies in North America and the “manifold comodities” that they would produce; Hakluyt presented this to Elizabeth in October 1584. Unlike Dee’s earlier presentations, Hakluyt’s seems not to have featured maps. Yet this is the only one of Hakluyt’s works in which he clearly reasoned from cartographic evidence. Significantly, the occasion for that reasoning was the feasibility of a Northwest Passage, whether by sea or by river and overland routes. That is to say, the definition of a new colonial ethos that emphasized the settlement—“planting”—of a continent was not in and of itself geographically controversial; it did, however, give rise to several political, economic, legal, and religious issues that Hakluyt addressed in his “Discourse” and in his later collections of voyages.

41. The one surviving manuscript was first published in 1877: Quinn and Quinn, “Hakluyt Chronology,” 1:284–86. A facsimile and transcription can be found in Richard Hakluyt, A Particuler Discourse Concerninge the Greate Necessitie and Manifold Comodities That Are Like to Growe to This Realme of Englande by the Westerne Discoueries Lately Attempted . . . Known As Discourse of Western Planting [1584], ed. David B. Quinn and Alison M. Quinn (London: Hakluyt Society, 1993), 80–87 (cap. 17), featuring cartographic reasoning.
Maps of extensive regions continued to play a significant role in shaping and formulating English colonial desires and imperial strategies, which is to say in underpinning the developing colonial ethos. This role can be seen, for example, in Baptista Boazio’s 1588 map of Drake’s transatlantic strategy against the Spanish, which also marked the route of Thomas Harriot and John White’s return in 1585 from the Roanoke colony; the route was deliberately misplaced to mislead the Spanish (fig. 59.5). It can also be seen in the presentation to Elizabeth of Emery Molyneux’s large globe in 1591, when the globe’s sponsor, the merchant William Sanderson, announced that it would show the Queen “at a glance how much of the seas she could control by means of her naval forces. This is a fact well worth knowing”; and in Hakluyt’s use in 1599 of Edward Wright’s map on Mercator’s projection to show “much of the world... hath beene hetherto discovered and is come to our knowledge” (fig. 59.6). Yet, as Raleigh’s circle pursued colonies of settlement, English colonial cartographic activities were reconfigured so as to emphasize, envision, and promote the qualities and cir-


45. On Wright’s map, see Cumming, Southeast in Early Maps, 131; Shirley, Mapping of the World, 238–39 (no. 221); Quinn, New Amer-
Size of the original: ca. 42.8 × 62.7 cm. Photograph courtesy of the BL (*Maps 920 [290]).
cumstances of particular colonial endeavors. But it must nonetheless be realized that in mapping out and making sense of precise colonial territories, the English relied primarily on the “legal cartographies” of charters and grants; regional, colonial maps remained a tool of promotion rather than of governance before 1640.46

Ralegh’s first attempt at establishing a colony in Virginia was based on remarkably little detailed geographical information, just the results of a reconnaissance voyage in 1584.47 The colonizing fleet itself included Thomas Harriot and John White, who had instructions to map and otherwise record in detail the new colony at Roanoke.48 Operating alongside the artistically gifted White, Harriot’s instinct for geometrical precision in the recording process ensured a fine cartographic record of the Carolina Banks. Of that assemblage just three manuscript maps survive, two in the British Museum (fig. 59.7), and one in TNA.49

**FIG. 59.7. JOHN WHITE, MANUSCRIPT MAP, 1585.** Watercolor with pen outlines depicting Chesapeake Bay to the Cape of Florida. Size of the original: 37 × 47.2 cm. Photograph © copyright the Trustees of the British Museum, London (1906-5-9-1 [2]).

49. British Museum, Department of Prints and Drawings, 1906-5-9-1[2] and [3]; TNA, MPG 1/584. These have been reproduced in Stefan Lorant, ed., _The New World: The First Pictures of America, Made by John White and Jacques Le Moyne and Engraved by Theodore de Bry, with Contemporary Narratives of the Huguenot Settlement in Florida, 1562–1565, and the Virginia Colony, 1585–1590_ (New York: Duell, Sloan and Pearce, 1946), 185–87, and P. H. Hulton and David B.
White and Harriot’s maps were not published in London, however, because the Privy Council still (if futilely) sought to restrict geographical knowledge from falling into the hands of the Spanish: Harriot’s account of the colony, published in large part to promote the second attempt to colonize Virginia, appeared without maps, and those in the second edition remained uninformative. They were instead printed in Germany for part one of Theodor de Bry’s *America* (1590), in which form they have been often reproduced.

In the 1590s, Ralegh augmented the long-standing English attempts to cut off at sea the flow of specie from the Americas to Spain with a scheme to create a similar flow of wealth by establishing an empire in northern South America, which he believed to be home to the fabled El Dorado. Like the first Virginia colonists, Ralegh sailed in 1595 with little geographical information, just persistent Spanish rumors; he would be led to explore the Orinoco.
Colonization and Cartography under the Early Stuarts

After 1603, James I’s strategic policy of peace with Spain led to the end of the Elizabethan era’s overtly militaristic schemes for colonization: Ralegh was perhaps set up to fail with his second expedition to Guiana in 1617–18. Peace with Spain encouraged the expansion of long-distance trade and colonial activities, supported by a developing ideology of colonialism that was epitomized by the work of Richard Hakluyt and his successor Samuel Purchas.57

A number of mercantile companies expanded rapidly after 1603. Notable among these was the East India Company, founded in 1600. The company tried to control the expansion of long-distance trade and colonial activities, supported by a developing ideology of colonialism that was epitomized by the work of Richard Hakluyt and his successor Samuel Purchas.57

Company merchants also found that maps and charts made useful presents with which to secure the goodwill of Asian magnates.58 Finally, merchants found it more effective to use maps as effective as did advocates of plantations in promoting investment: William Baffin’s map illustrating the route of Sir Thomas Roe’s 1613 embassy to the Earl of Northumberland. The vicissitudes of Ralegh’s map collection and survival confirm because Harriot had secreted it within the possessions of another prisoner, the Earl of Northumberland. The vicissitudes of Ralegh’s map collection suggest that the strategic value of colonial maps was well appreciated by government officials, merchants, and would-be investors by the end of the Elizabethan era.56

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the 1615 voyage; on his manuscript chart, three flags situated along the north of Hudson’s Bay represented both the company and the English crown. Even so, the region’s adverse climate, lack of obvious natural resources, and Baffin’s “owne despaire of passage that way” detracted from the region’s colonial potential, so that even as Purchas included Baffin’s journal in his Pilgrimes, he declined to print the map. Instead, Purchas included a more expansive map of North America by Henry Briggs, who argued that the passage connected to Hudson’s Bay. Further voyages were subsequently sent out to explore the bay in an effort to prove, or disprove, Briggs’s contentions.61

Westward-looking mercantile interest was mostly focused on fishing, to a small degree on whaling, and on small-scale trade with Native Americans for furs. Some Englishmen also participated with the Danes in exploiting the Greenland and Svalbard fisheries. The result was a steady increase in cartographic knowledge of the North American coasts.62 At the same time, a few London merchants and members of the West Country gentry sought to

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reimplement older proposals for plantations in North America and, as ever, maps figured prominently. By 1610, their activities had taken sufficient root for James to take stock of them all. As the Spanish ambassador in London, Alonzo de Velasco, recorded, James apparently ordered “a surveyor to survey that Province [Virginia]”; this surveyor, perhaps Samuel Argall, who sailed along the North American coast in July and August 1610, returned to London in December 1610 or January 1611 and presented James with a map, of which Velasco sent a copy to Philip III in Spain. Only this Spanish copy is now known of the final map, which formed a composite of the charts and maps produced by English as well as Dutch and French excursions in the New World (fig. 59.10).63

63. Archivo General de Simancas, 2588, fol. 25 (Velasco to Philip III, 22 March 1611) and the associated manuscript map. All discussions of this crucial map stem from the initial study by Alexander Brown, Genesis of the United States, 2 vols. (Boston: Houghton, Mifflin, 1890), 1: 455–61. Subsequent discussions were reviewed by Cumming, Southeast in Early Maps, 137–38. See also Philip L. Barbour, The Jamestown Voyages under the First Charter, 1606–1609, 2 vols. (London: Hakluyt Society by Cambridge University Press, 1969), 2:336; Quinn and Quinn, English New England Voyages, 520–25; Quinn, New
THE AMAZON AND GUIANA

English interest in South America continued even after Walter Ralegh’s failed expeditions to Guiana and El Dorado. Some English were interested in exploiting alluvial gold, others in establishing sugar plantations. Sir Thomas Morton and his associates underwrote a number of exploratory voyages after 1610 that generated a large amount of geographical information recorded in a series of manuscript charts. The findings of Captain Matthew Morton, for example, were incorporated into a chart of the River Amazon completed by Gabriel Tatton in 1615. It recorded information from English and Irish explorers of the North Amazon channel as far as Manheno, between the Equator and 40ºS, in search of alluvial gold and land for planting sugar. The founding of the joint-stock Amazon Company in 1620 would allow London’s investors to take on the high risks involved in growing, refining, and marketing sugar; in the era of the Amazon Company’s control, Joannes de Laet engraved Tatton’s 1615 chart of the Amazon in 1625 for his book Nieuwe wereldt, presenting it to Charles I in 1633. This presentation suggests the need of the Amazon traders to cultivate royal favor to offset the crown’s vacillating support for South American ventures, as it sought to placate the Spanish for reasons of European politics; eventually, ventures in South America were abandoned in favor of projects in less politically sensitive North America and the Caribbean.

BERMUDA AND THE WEST INDIES

In 1611, the Governor and Company of the City of London for the Plantation of the Somers Islands thought that Bermuda, or Lord Somers Isles (and so more colloquially the Summer Isles), constituted an attractive investment. To prove this proposition, they first required a map of its initial settlement, also showing that it had been fortified against a potential Spanish or Catholic threat. Richard Norwood had completed such a map of Bermuda by 1617, showing every plot available to the “undertakers,” or London investors, at £12.10s each. It was printed in London 1622, although no impressions survive; later versions of Norwood’s map were published in John Smith’s promotional tract, The Generall Historie of Virginia, New-England, and the Summer Isles (1624) (fig. 59.11)—much reduced and surrounded by images of the island’s protective forts—and at full size in John Speed’s world atlas of 1627.

A single surviving English survey of Curaçao, which probably dates from the tenure of the Providence and Henrietta Island Company, reveals the extent of the original township and fort as it stood before the island’s capture by the Dutch in 1634. The map may have been repatriated to London by the company’s German minister in 1634, so avoiding the destruction of the colony’s early cartographic records during a 1635 Spanish raid on Tortuga and a plague of rats in 1637. After the Spanish raid, the company was directed from London, as the Privy Council’s Colonial Entry Book records in 1637, “to maintain the

American World, vol. 5, fig. 140, with details reproduced in vol. 3, figs. 108 (New England area) and 111 (Virginia).

64. Joannes de Laet, Nieuwe Wereldt (Leiden, 1625). For Gabriel Tatton’s chart of the River Amazon, see Lorimer, English and Irish Settlement on the River Amazon, 48–49; Tyacke, “English Charting of the River Amazon,” 73 and 76; and Baldwin, Harriot’s Circle, 28–32.


66. “A Mappe of the island of Currsaw with harbors, towne and forre, And also a description of the towne and forte ten times ye bignes of ye forte poynte in ye maine map,” TNA, CO 700/West Indies no. 4. The cataloger assigned it a date of about 1700. The company’s odd, quasi-colonial remit is clear from its charter whose text appears in BL, Sloane MS. 793 and Add. MS. 10615.
forts and other defences” rather than hand them over to the Dutch. 67 This order may explain why the map survives, because other enterprises, such as the Providence Island Company, which operated in the Caribbean from 1631 to 1641, focused on the raiding of seaborne commerce and so had little need for land maps. The Providence Island Company’s proprietors relied largely on Nicholas Comberford’s charts of Hispaniola (whose agriculture is far better shown than any soundings of its harbors) and tiny Tortuga, used to sustain sea raids on the Iberian ships taking bullion back to Spain from New Spain and Peru. 68

Conversely, the development of agricultural settlements did not guarantee the production and publication of maps. In the case of the Leeward Islands, where agriculture was economically more important than raiding, maps of the colonies were not published for distribution through the marketplace to potential settlers and investors until the 1650s. This delay was because there was initially no lack of settlers and so no need to drum up support for the colony. Under his royal grant as the first “Proprietor the English Caribbees” (that is, Barbados and the Leeward Islands), the Earl of Carlisle was so successful in attracting settlers to Barbados after 1627 that overflow settlements were established on St. Kitts and Nevis in 1628 and on Antigua and Montserrat after 1632. Richard Ligon in his account of Barbados, which had the intent of promoting sugar plantations in the Caribbean, used a map displaying the numerous plantations on the island, together with several vignettes of gentlemen riding and hunting in the interior, to indicate its future potential. 69

VIRGINIA

Some London merchants and a consortium of gentry and merchants in the West Country were interested in exploiting the economic potential of the North American mainland, which they continued to call Virginia. To regulate their ventures, James I in 1606 chartered the Royal Council of Virginia to oversee their activities, reserving “northern Virginia” between 38° and 45°N for the West Country group (also known as the Plymouth Company) and “southern Virginia” between 34° and 41°N for the London merchants. Both groups sought to establish permanent settlements in 1607, if not before—the Plymouth Company at the mouth of the Kennebec River, and the London Company in Chesapeake Bay. The northern settlement barely lasted one winter; cartographically, it was marked by a single, optimistic plan of the settlement itself surrounded by the earthworks and fortifications proposed to be built on the site; the plan has survived in a copy taken surreptitiously by the Spanish ambassador. 70 The southern settlement of Jamestown eventually succeeded, but only after a hesitant, and famously uncertain beginning. In England, internal dissension and the failure of the northern settlement led to the formation in 1609 of a new Virginia Company comprised solely of the London merchants; what had been labeled southern Virginia now became Virginia per se.

In selecting a site for the Jamestown colony on Chesapeake Bay, the London merchants sought also to establish and control a route across the continent that would allow them easy access to the Indies. In this effort they were evidently driven by the persistent belief that the central portion of North America comprised a relatively narrow strip of land separating the Atlantic from the Pacific oceans. This belief was enshrined in John Dee’s ca. 1580 map (see fig. 59.3) and in Michael Lok’s map in Hakluyt’s Divers Voyages (1582) (see fig. 59.4). It is strongly echoed in the ca. 1611 Velasco map, with its depiction of a western coast for Virginia not too far inland (see fig. 59.10). The instructions to the settlers in the first expedition of December 1606 were therefore explicit: they were to settle on a navigable river, preferably one that tended “most towards the Northwest for that way shall You soonest find the Other Sea”; moreover, the settlers were to determine whether this river originated in mountains or in lakes, for “if it be out of any Lake the passage to the Other Sea will be the more Easy & it is Like Enough that Out of the same Lake you shall find Some Spring which run the Contrary way toward the East India Sea.” 71 Several parties were ac-


cordingly sent out in 1607 and 1608 to explore the rivers that flow into Chesapeake Bay. Three of the sketch maps generated by these surveys have survived because of the curiosity of James and his eldest son Prince Henry Frederick, a fervent supporter of colonialism, and of the espionage efforts of the Spanish ambassador.72 The results of all these river surveys are evident in the Velasco map.

The early history of the Virginia colony is inseparable in the modern mind from the story of John Smith, the military adventurer who accompanied and quarreled with the gentlemen who led the first Jamestown settlers. Smith had done much of the river explorations, in the course of one of which he had his famous encounter with Powhatan and Pocahontas. Smith left Virginia in 1609 and dedicated himself to publicizing the potential of the American colonies, and his own role therein, after the English had been significantly discouraged by the severe difficulties experienced by the first settlers in Bermuda, Virginia, and New England. A crucial element of his publicity was the map of Virginia that he had printed in 1612 (fig. 59.12). There has been some argument about whether Smith actually made the map himself or whether it was the work of Captain Nathaniel Powle, although Purchas did credit the map specifically to Smith; the delineation of Chesapeake Bay has enough in common with the Velasco map that Barbour concluded they were both derived from the same source. Regardless, Smith was responsible for having the map printed, in conjunction with the explanatory pamphlet that described the colony itself, and distributing many hundreds of copies to potential patrons at court, London merchants, and West Country gentry who might conceivably be interested in supporting future colonial endeavors.73

Smith’s map has two features to entice the possible colonial investor. First, at the top of the map, to the west, there lies the edge of what might seem to be the putative western sea and so an easy route to Cathay and its riches. Second, Smith made an overt claim to know what he was talking about from direct observation. A ring of Maltese crosses bound, according to a note on the map, what “hath bin discouerd” while “beyond is by relation.” This element of the map has been taken to exemplify the extent to which Smith and other Englishmen depended on indigenous peoples for their knowledge,74 but it must be recognized that the crosses encompass almost all of the map’s detailed representation of geographical features and Indian settlements; that is to say, even as he recorded the role that the Indians played in the English discovery of Virginia, Smith rhetorically subordinated Indian contributions to direct English observation. Furthermore, two vignettes, one of Powhatan at the time when Smith appeared before him as a prisoner, one of a “gyant like” Susquehanna derived from Theodor de Bry’s engraving of a drawing by John White, spoke to Smith having seen and expe-
Colonial settlement in Virginia was initially slow and limited to the communal settlement. In 1614, however, tobacco grown in the colony was sold for the first time in London, spawning long-distance interest in establishing commercial plantations. Accordingly, the company’s officers twice directed the governor to make detailed property maps, in 1616 and 1618, but no surveys seem to have been undertaken and no maps were made. Eventually, in 1621, the company appointed a surveyor general who would make the necessary surveys. From the start, this official was intended to be a relatively minor servant of the colonial government, as befitted a measurer of land: the company rejected Richard Norwood, apparently because he demanded too high a salary; their first appointee, William Claiborne, a young man with few credentials as a surveyor, served only until about 1625 or 1626, when he became secretary of the colony, a much more lucrative position, and began to acquire extensive properties. The 1624 dissolution of the Virginia Company and the colony’s reorganization as a royal province did little to augment the surveyor general’s authority or pay. Moreover, the relatively low density of settlers, despite the large sizes of grants (ranging up to ten thousand acres), and the practice of allowing grantees to locate their own grants meant that there were few contested boundaries in the early years of the colony. As a result, few surveys were undertaken; indeed, the “haphazard descriptions” of property “often left

in question whether the surveyor had even been on the land.” The plantations were laid out as rectangles fronting on watercourses, requiring only the measurement of the frontage and two sides running approximately perpendicular to the water; the oldest plan of such a crude survey to survive dates from 1639. Only in the 1640s were compasses introduced to help delineate grants with more complex shapes; only in 1642 were surveyors legally required to provide plans of each parcel of land they surveyed, a requirement that seems to have stemmed from an increase in boundary disputes. Overall, the early land surveys were approximate, depending more upon placing boundary markers in the landscape than upon detailed property surveys and plans.76

NEW ENGLAND AND NEW SCOTLAND

John Smith was also instrumental in the establishment of the second successful early English colony in the New World: “New England.” After leading a small expedition in 1614 to fish the waters off Monhegan Island, to trade for furs, and to prospect for gold in the region known variously as northern Virginia or Norumbega,77 midway between the English settlements of Virginia and the French settlements along the St. Lawrence, he sought to promote English settlement in what was for Europeans a no-man’s land.78 Once again, he used printed books and maps which he distributed in person to potential investors and patrons. His Description of New England was printed late in 1616, with the map appearing probably later in early 1617 (fig. 59.13).79 Rhetorically, Smith promoted the region as being already English in character. Famously, seeking to win royal favor, he sent a copy of his manuscript to Prince Charles, the future Charles I, asking him to replace its “barbarous” Abenaki place-names “for such English [names] as Posterry may say, Prince Charles was their godfather.” This imperious act has been held as the epitome of Europe’s eradication of the presence of Native Americans from the North American landscape by writing them out of the landscape—that they had helped map for the Europeans—to create images of a completely Europeanized landscape.80 Most of the names applied by the prince did not in fact survive the processes whereby English colonizers would come into contact with the region’s native peoples. Thus Smith’s map, like all the printed maps of putative English colonies, sought to visualize colonial desires rather than provide a pragmatic and instrumental aid to actual settlement.

Smith’s vision was indeed powerful. It persuaded West Country gentry to secure in 1621 a charter from James I as the Council for New England. The council’s twenty members initially sought to divide up their large territory among themselves: appearing before the king in 1623, they drew lots keyed to land grants marked out on a map by their secretary.81 The results of the lottery were recorded by Sir William Alexander on his 1624 map of New Scotland (fig. 59.14); Alexander had received this huge grant in 1621 from James as king of Scotland and now wished to demonstrate that the Scottish nobles who participated in his proprietary colony would receive similarly large chunks of territory.82 At the same time, tight religious and social regulation by the English church and state led religious and social dissidents to latch onto Smith’s New England as a distant—yet manifestly En-

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82. Sir William Alexander, untitled map of New Scotland, originally prepared for his An Encouragement to Colonies (London: Printed by William Stansby, 1624), which was reprinted in Edmund F. Slafter, Sir William Alexander and American Colonization . . . (Boston: Prince Society, 1873), 149–216 (map opp. 216). The map also informs the descriptions in Purchas, Pilgrimes, 4:1871–75 (“Noua Scotia. The Kings Patent to Sir William Alexander Knight, for the Plantation of New Scotland in America, and his proceedings therein; with a description of Ma-wooshen for better knowledge of those parts”). See also Wallis, “Purchas’s Maps,” 161 and fig. 5. On Alexander’s purpose in printing the map, see his Encouragement to Colonies, 31.
lish—place to which they might escape. The first such group sailed in December 1620, under a grant from the Virginia Company, explicitly motivated by Smith’s map and pamphlet; indeed, settling at the point labeled “Plymouth” on the map, they called their own colony (New) Plymouth. The formation of the New England Company under a 1628 grant from the Council for New England, reconfigured in 1629 as the Governor and Company of the Massachusetts Bay in New England by means of a charter obtained directly from the crown, inaugurated a period of concerted colonial settlement until the Long Parliament met in 1640 and ended the religious policies of Charles I, which stopped the immediate motivation for migration.

A variety of literature, of varying degrees of reliability and expertise, was printed and distributed in England promoting the migration to New England. One account based on first-hand knowledge was William Wood’s New Englands Prospect, published in London in 1634 and reprinted in 1635 and 1639. Wood had evidently lived in New England for four years before he returned to England in 1633. In chapter ten of his tract, Wood provided a verbal map of the new colonial settlements and the re-

maining Indian villages around Massachusetts Bay; at the book’s front was tipped in a revealing woodcut map, titled *The South Part of New-England* (fig. 59.15). The Indian villages are each marked by three triangles surrounded by a palisade and labeled with the name of their sachem (or sagamore); those without palisades seem to have been deserted during the devastating 1633 smallpox epidemic. By contrast, the English settlements are marked by crossed circles suggesting their proper constitution as Christian communities.84

As was the case with the colonial settlement of Virginia, there was so much widowed land—that is, land once used by native peoples—in New England that, as the first colonists rapidly dispersed, they did not have to compete among themselves or with the remaining native population for land; nor did they need to demarcate precisely the boundaries of their first settlements. John Winthrop, Jr., might in 1637 have made a detailed plan of the large farm just north of Boston granted to his father for his services as the colony’s founding governor, but this was more of an “estate plan” in the English mode, and its style was not duplicated in subsequent work.85 The first generation of English settlers created real property in New England on the

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ground, by fencing off small lots and defining the boundaries of townships with trenches and monuments made from large piles of stones, without the benefit of measured surveys or graphic plans. Indeed, the oldest surviving property plan, more a sketch than the result of a precisely measured survey, dates only from 1656, and no law requiring the surveying and preparation of maps of new land grants would be enacted until 1682.

The New England experience was again similar to Virginia in that the first colonists were presented with a largely unknown interior that they needed to understand. Records are few, so most of this mapping process is uncertain. Yet after only seven years, Governor John Winthrop—who had himself revealed something of a flair for cartography—was able in 1636 or 1637 to send a manuscript map of the settlements in and around Massachusetts Bay to Robert Ryece in London; Ryece had requested information, explicitly asking for a map, about the Puritan settlements. Although the map was probably not drawn by Winthrop, some annotations concerning the upper course of the Merrimac River have been identified as being in his hand. The courses of the Merrimac and Charles rivers were of great importance to the colonial authorities because Massachusetts Bay’s 1629 charter used the rivers as reference points for defining the boundaries of the colony. An initial survey of the Merrimac was attempted in 1639, using native guides and producing a manuscript plan. The spread of English colonists inland to the Connecticut River valley in 1635 raised the question of whether their new settlements lay within the colony’s bounds; the authorities in Boston accordingly sent Nathaniel Woodward in 1638 and again in 1642, then with Solomon Saffery, to determine the latitude of the colony’s southern boundary and to mark that same latitude on the Connecticut River; they found that the new settlements did indeed fall outside the bounds of Massachusetts Bay. But as with the surveys for real property, no concerted boundary surveys would be undertaken until after 1720.

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88. Harral Ayres, The Great Trail of New England (Boston: Meador, 1940), 25–29 and 347–63, remains the best account of Woodward and Saffery, although still flawed by the insistence that they made a map of the colony’s southern boundary. Benes, New England Prospect, 27 (no. 23).
English merchants were interested in the Maritimes as a site of fishing and whaling throughout the Tudor period. After 1570, a number of schemes were advanced to establish a permanent presence on the coasts close to the fishing grounds. Within the context of English competition with the Spanish, such schemes inevitably entailed general, regional maps. Thus, Sir Humphrey Gilbert laid claim to Newfoundland’s fishery at St. John’s in 1583, in large part relying on John Dee’s cartography. As the fisheries in the Gulf of Maine and further offshore on the Grand Banks became increasingly important to the English economy, they became prominent features on English printed maps in the early seventeenth century, such as John Mason’s 1625 map of Newfoundland and William Alexander’s 1624 promotional map (see fig. 59.14); the last state of Smith’s map of New England, first published in 1635, features a large school of fish just off to sea. These fisheries would be a staple feature of maps of North America throughout the colonial era.

However, Welsh and English sailors in the Newfoundland fisheries used small ships supported by little capital

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investment. In common with fishermen today, they seem to have kept actual navigational knowledge of the fisheries to themselves. Moreover, their settlements were mostly seasonal and oriented solely to the task of drying fish and supporting inshore fishing; the climate made agriculture difficult. Consequently, only a few early seventeenth-century maps survive to show specific fishing sites; notable among them are Samuel de Champlain’s maps from 1603–7, which depict the French settlements in the Bay of Fundy before they were laid waste by Samuel Argall in 1613.93

MARYLAND

One of the several failed attempts to establish a permanent colony on Newfoundland was that of George Calvert, first Earl Baltimore; his scheme was to establish an Irish Catholic colony there. But having failed in 1628 to secure permanent naval protection for the colony as a fishing base,94 he turned his attention to more southerly sites with better potential for agriculture. In 1632, Charles I granted Baltimore the right to establish a Catholic colony in the peninsula across the Chesapeake Bay from Virginia. The first earl’s younger son, Leonard, led an initial expedition in 1633–34 to settle the grant, called Maryland, and a promotional tract was quickly published in London. Like the various proposals for colonies under the Council for New England, the idea was to divide Maryland into large “manors”; the purpose of the pamphlet was to attract wealthy individuals to invest in each manor by committing to ship actual settlers to the colony. The pamphlet’s second chapter described the colony’s physical situation and was prefaced by a map, with a very prominent royal coat of arms as well as that of the earls Baltimore, indicating that a welcoming land that was wide open for division into manors (fig. 59.16).95 Elton argued that this map “testified to an energetic contentment with things English,” or at least with things English and aristocratic. But of the seventeen major landowners who arrived in 1633, only four remained by 1638. In such circumstances, with distant landlords and an abundance of land, there was little need for detailed land surveys in this early period.96

CONCLUSIONS

English overseas ventures between the late fifteenth and early seventeenth centuries relied heavily on cartographic imagery. The ships’ captains and masters recorded their voyages in the Atlantic, Indian, Arctic, and Pacific oceans using established marine practices of log-keeping and chartmaking. Both commercial companies and the Privy Council who variously sponsored these voyages sought to limit the distribution of this sensitive nautical information. Not that they were particularly successful in this; certainly, Spanish diplomats in London were able to acquire and preserve a great many supposedly secret or restricted documents, including maps. At the same time, as Tyacke argues in chapter 58 in this volume, the demand in England for sea charts remained small enough that there was no economic incentive to incur the cost of engraving and printing sea charts for sale in the marketplace; a market for printed charts, especially charts of the American waters, would not develop until the later seventeenth century.

The English settlements in Bermuda, Virginia, New England, and Maryland were barely established on the eastern edge of the continent when the turmoil of the English Civil War diverted much of the interest in colonial endeavors; as such, they had undertaken only the most rudimentary mapping of the territories they claimed in support of settlement and resource extraction.

In contrast, geographical maps proved to be truly crucial in allowing merchants, gentry, courtiers, and royalty in London to conceptualize and to comprehend the scope of colonial ventures. World, polar, and hemispheric maps all served to conceptualize England’s place in the world and, more especially, to delineate its connections with the world’s richer parts: all that was necessary was for the English to implement those connections by means of the Northeast and Northwest Passages. Time and again, mariners were sent into northern waters on the strength of visions accorded by often crudely prepared maps; the truth of what mariners reported once they returned to England depended on other markers, such as verbal eyewitness accounts and mineral assays, yet the colonial vision was ultimately cartographic in nature. After 1578, as some Englishmen grew interested in North America for what it could provide, rather than as an obstacle to be circumvented, they began to issue a new set of geographical maps with a narrower territorial focus. The world and hemispheric maps were not concerned with the details of the emerging colonial order. Rather, regional maps were used

93. On the maps of Samuel de Champlain, see chapter 51 in this volume.
to conceptualize and to promote each colony. Indeed, they became a cornerstone of discourses about the English colonies. Writing in rural Cambridgeshire, a former Virginian colonist, John Ferrar, could in 1651 accordingly express his confidence in maps as part of a new colonial and spatial order, when he persuaded Edward Williams to add his map of Virginia to Williams’s Virgo Triumphans. Ferrar noted in the margin of his copy of the book: “A map had binn very proper to this Book. For all men love to see the country as well as to heare of it.”

There was something of a divide between the use of manuscript and printed geographical maps. When discourse about a particular venture was limited in scope, as when Sir Humphrey Gilbert wrote to his brother in 1566 or when John Dee addressed Elizabeth I and her ministers in 1577 and 1578, maps were produced and consumed in manuscript. But when a discourse was extended to encompass a wider community of potential investors and patrons, then advocates of colonial projects ventured into print. Manuscript and printed maps worked together within geographically privileged circles, such as those centered on Gilbert and Ralegh. Print permitted a wider audience—one not so well connected intellectually—to attain the privilege of knowing the world. But we should not think that print necessarily entailed widespread publicity. The few impressions of Dee’s General and Rare Memorials and John Smith’s personal distribution of his many pamphlets suggest that we cannot presume that printing necessarily entailed broad publicity. When we factor in the small print runs typical of English books before the development of a truly public discourse after 1650, we are left to conclude that the actual reach of the printed maps remained comparatively small.

Nonetheless, printed geographical maps made an undeniable contribution to the formation of images of multiple English colonies. Almost all of the regional maps in promotional tracts prominently included the royal coat of arms to proclaim that each colony was indeed an English territory; if so, they did not include the coats of arms of the mercantile companies through which they were organized; they did not, for example, “proclaim Virginia as a territory of the Virginia Company.” There were two exceptions to this rule. First, the 1635 map promoting Maryland (see fig. 59.16) also included the coat of arms of the proprietors, the earls Baltimore; this inclusion is understandable in that the earls sought to implement an idealization of a hierarchical, aristocratic society and so needed to situate themselves as viceroys of the English crown. Second, the eighth state of Smith’s map of New England featured the addition of the ornate coat-of-arms of the Council for New England; this addition to the map was made in 1631, after the crown had issued the 1629 charter for Massachusetts Bay and had effectively nullified the council’s authority. The deployment on the printed maps of English toponyms reinforced the claim that these maps were English territory and so marginalized and excluded the Native Americans. Moreover, the consumption of these printed maps arranged merchants, provincial gentry, and courtiers—social groups still largely distinguished by social rules—into a single discursive community. We can thus say that the printed maps contributed to a belief, widely held in the sense that it crossed several social divides, in a common English project of overseas ventures.

In other words, we can identify a proto-nationalistic Englishness forming through the printed geographical maps of overseas colonies, much as the same proto-nationalism has been identified in the printed geographical maps of England and its counties. A case has been made that the crown itself used the system of print censorship to create this image, but this is doubtful, especially when it is remembered that the primary interest of the crown in geographically representing colonies lay not in maps but in the verbal geographical delineation of territory in charters, patents, and grants. The pursuit of colonial endeavors and the concomitant participation within geographical discourses emphasizing England’s overseas relations and territories functioned together to create the germs of an ideology of the English as an imperial nation.


99. Sabin et al., Bibliotheca Americana, 231. It should also be noted that Smith included the coat-of-arms that he claimed for himself on both his printed maps of Virginia and New England, a presumption indicative of his personal desire for self-aggrandizement.

