The Supreme Court Economic Review, Volume 16
350 pages
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6-1/8 x 9-1/4
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© 2008
Supreme Court Economic Review is an interdisciplinary journal that seeks to provide a forum for scholarship in law and economics, public choice, and constitutional political economy. Its approach is broad ranging and contributions employ explicit or implicit economic reasoning for the analysis of legal issues, with special attention to Supreme Court decisions, judicial process, and institutional design. Volume 16 contributors are Guiseppe Dari-Mattiacci, Vincy Fon, Nuno Garoupa, Keith N. Hylton, Sheldon Kimmel, Tonja Jacobi, David M. Levy, John O. McGinnis, Sandra J. Peart, Michael Rappaport, Neil S. Siegel, and Todd J. Zywicki.
Contents
The Judicial Signaling Game: How Judges Shape Their Dockets
Tonja Jacobi
Tonja Jacobi
The Condorcet Case for Supermajority Rules
John O. McGinnis and Michael Rappaport
The Unsolvable Dilemma of a Paretian Policymaker
Giuseppe Dari-Mattiacci and Nuno Garoupa
Integral Proportional System: Aligning Electoral Votes More Closely with State Popular Votes
Vincy Fon
Adam Smith, Collusion and “Right” at the Supreme Court
David M. Levy and Sandra J. Peart
Dole’s Future: A Strategic Analysis
Neil S. Siegel
Preemption and Products Liability: A Positive Theory
Keith N. Hylton
How and Why the Per Se Rule Against Price-Fixing Went Wrong
Sheldon Kimmel
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Economics and Business: Economics--General Theory and Principles
Law and Legal Studies: The Constitution and the Courts
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