The Supreme Court Economic Review, Volume 5

Edited by Harold Demsetz, Ernest Gellhorn, and Nelson Lund

Edited by Harold Demsetz, Ernest Gellhorn, and Nelson Lund

250 pages | 6-1/8 x 9-1/4 | © 1996
Cloth $45.00 ISBN: 9780226286877 Published June 1997
This interdisciplinary review series provides an economic analysis of
the situations and events that generate a case or group of cases decided
by the United States Supreme Court, the implicit or explicit economic
reasoning employed by the Court to reach its decisions, and the economic
consequences of the Court's decisions.

SCER is sponsored by the Law & Economics Center of the George
Mason University School of Law.
Contents
Babbitt v Sweet Home Chapters of Oregon: The Law and Economics of Habitat Preservation, Richard A. Epstein
How Term Limits Enhance the Expression of Democratic Preferences, Einer Elhauge, John R. Lott, Jr. and Richard L. Manning
De-Bates and Re-Bates: The Supreme Court's Latest Commercial Speech Cases, Fred S. McChesney
Welfare Magnets: The Race for the Top, F. H. Buckley and Margaret F. Brinig
BMW v Gore: Mitigating The Punitive Economics of Punitive Damages, Paul H. Rubin, John E. Calfee and Mark F. Grady
Mistake of Federal Criminal Law: A Study of Coalitions and Costly Information, Richard S. Murphy and Erin A. O'Hara
For more information, or to order this book, please visit http://www.press.uchicago.edu
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