Politics and Property Rights
The Closing of the Open Range in the Postbellum South
In this original study, Kantor uses economic analysis to show that, contrary to traditional historical interpretation, this conflict was centered on anticipated benefits from fencing livestock rather than on class, cultural, or ideological differences. Kantor proves that the stock law brought economic benefits; at the same time, he analyzes why the law's adoption was hindered in many areas where it would have increased wealth. This argument illuminates the dynamics of real-world institutional change, where transactions are often costly and where some inefficient institutions persist while others give way to economic growth.
1: The Dynamics of Institutional Change: An Analytical Framework
2: The Economic Benefits of Livestock Enclosure
3: Translating Economic Interest into Action: Distributional Conflicts and the Dynamics of Institutional Change
4: Resolving the Distributional Conflicts
5: The Politics of Property Rights
6: Uncovering the Ideology of Property Rights Reform in the Postbellum South
7: Property Rights and Populists: The Political Consequences of Livestock Enclosure
Epilogue: A Note on Institutional Change, Efficiency, and Democracy
App. A: Procedure Used to Calculate Expected Savings from the Stock Law
App. B: Data Appendix to Carroll and Jackson County Election Regressions
Notes
References
Index
Economics and Business: Economics--History
History: American History
Law and Legal Studies: Legal History
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