Moses Mendelssohn

The Soul [Translated from the Hebrew]

FIRST TREATISE

The doctrine of the immortality of the soul, insofar as it is a foundation of the Torah, divides into three main parts. To secure the truth of this doctrine, we must speak about all three.

The first main part, titled “The Spirituality of the Soul,” shows that the soul is no body, but a simple substance;

the second main part, titled “The Imperishability of the Soul,” shows that the soul does not perish at the death of its body and that it does not die for all eternity;

the third main part, titled “The True Life of the Soul,” shows that the soul lives on after the death of its body and preserves reason as well as recollection of everything that happened during its union with the body.

To begin with, we set forth a proof for the spirituality of the soul that leaves no further room for any objection.
ON THE SPIRITUALITY OF THE SOUL

1

Every existing thing is either a single substance or a synthesis\(^{11}\) of many substances.\(^{12}\) The synthesis is called a composite thing:\(^{13}\) its parts are the substances whose synthesis it is; the thing that is the single substance is called a simple thing. \(^{204}\)

2

The essence\(^{14}\) of a composite thing consists of the essence of the parts of which the whole is formed \emph{and} the mode and manner\(^{15}\) of its synthesis, that is, the order\(^{16}\) of their juxtaposition\(^{17}\) and the relationship of each of the parts to the remaining ones with respect to measurement\(^{18}\) and location.\(^{19}\) For example, the essence of the human body consists of nothing else but the essence of the flesh, blood, sinews, veins, \(^{124}\) and nerves, in short, of the essence of the component parts \emph{and} the mode and manner of their synthesis with respect to location, order, and correct relationship.\(^{20}\) The essence of a tree consists of the essence of the root, trunk, branches, and leaves \emph{and} the mode and manner of their synthesis with respect to location and appropriate\(^{21}\) relationship. It is the same with all composite things.

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\(^{11}\) Ger.: \emph{Verbindung}. Heb.: יָסָרֵר. The corresponding Mendelssohnian terms vary, however: in \textit{Seele/HaNefesh} §2, \emph{Verbindung} is \כַּפִּי and later \כָּפָר; at \textit{Seele} 214.1/\textit{HaNefesh} 131.3, it is \כְּפָר; and at 226.18/139.22, it is \כָּפָר. The cognate German verb is \emph{verbinden}, which is always “combine” (except at 232.30/144.5, where it is “bind up”); here too, the corresponding Mendelssohnian terms vary: at §§14 and 17, it is \כָּפָר and \כָּפָר, respectively; at 220.31/135.25, it is \כָּפָר; at 226.37/140.1, it is \כָּפָר; at 232.18/143.26, it is \כָּפָר, and at 232.30/144.5, it is \כָּפָר.

\(^{12}\) Cf. Leibniz, \textit{Principes de la nature et de la grâce} §1 [Wie 522 or ArGa 207 or FrWo 258f.], and Wolff, \textit{Ontologia} §685. \{LS\}

\(^{13}\) Ger.: zusammengesetztes Ding. Heb.: יָסָרֵר.

\(^{14}\) Ger.: \emph{Wesen}. Heb.: אֱמוֹת.

\(^{15}\) Ger.: \emph{Art und Weise}. Heb.: אָסָפ.

\(^{16}\) Ger.: \emph{Ordnung}. Heb.: הָדַר.

\(^{17}\) Ger.: \emph{Nebeneinander-Sein}. Heb.: מְשָׁרָה וְהַךְ בִּם הַזָּה.

\(^{18}\) Ger.: \emph{Maß}. Heb.: יָשָׁר.

\(^{19}\) Cf. Wolff, \textit{Ontologia} §§533f. \{LS\} Ger.: \emph{Lage}. Heb.: יָשָׁר.

\(^{20}\) Ger.: \emph{Verhältnis}. Heb.: יָשָׁר.

\(^{21}\) Ger.: \emph{gehörige}. Heb.: נָאָה.
Order and relationship belong to the category of relation; for a concept of them is gained only by means of the comparison of one thing with another (see *Logical Terms*, chapter 11).

The relation does not come about through one of the *relata*, but through both, or, if there are many, through all of these. If, e.g., A and B are *relata*, then obviously the relation comes about not through A alone and not through B alone, but through both of them, by means of the contrast and comparison of A and B. Therefore, the relation does not come about outside the soul. For the comparison of one thing with another belongs to the activity of the soul that perceives and compares the things.

The essence of a composite thing does not come about through a substratum existing outside the soul; for, as has been argued (§2), the commonality, relationship, and order of the parts—that is, relations (§3)—belong to the essence of the composite thing; they do not come about through any one of the parts of the composite thing, but through all of them (§4) by means of the comparison of each one of the parts with all the remaining ones. Now since each part has its isolated existence, the commonality that is the substratum of the relation can be represented only in the soul that perceives, contrasts, and compares the parts with one another.

Each sensation is a representation in the soul that results from a composite sense-object, for the cause of the sensation is a movement in the human body and in the sense organs; and the body is composite.

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22 For §§3–5, cf. *Phädon* 92.26ff. [Cul 126ff.; Nob 126ff.] and *Unsterblichkeit* 165.27ff. {LS}
25 See *Logik* 229f. [at www.press.uchicago.edu/sites/strauss/, loc. cit.] {LS}
26 Ger.: *Tätigkeit*. Heb.: פעולה.
27 Ger.: perfizierte. Heb.: פעילה.
28 Ger.: *Substrat*. Heb.: נושא.
29 Ger.: *Gemeinschaft*. Heb.: כלולת.
30 Ger.: *Dasein*. Heb.: מציאות.
31 Ger.: *Empfindung*. Heb.: הרות. In §10, *Empfindung* is *הרות*.
32 Ger.: *Vorstellung*. Heb.: זריא.
33 Ger.: *Sinnengegenstand*. Heb.: מציאות.
34 Ger.: *Ursache*. Heb.:缘.
35 Cf. Wolff, VGGM §794: “... sensations presuppose a body that touches our sense organs. Bodies are composite things. And, to that extent, sensations presuppose composite things. The soul, in which this representation happens, is a simple thing. To that extent, the composite is
The substratum of sensation is a simple substance, not a composite one. For assuming that it were composite, its essence would obviously not come about outside the soul (§5); it itself would therefore be dependent on another substratum on which the commonality of the parts rested: this would go on to infinity, which is obviously absurd. In the end, therefore, one necessarily comes to a substratum subsisting for its own sake, on which the connections and relationship of the parts rest without its depending on another substratum. This substratum is a *simple substance*—not one composed out of many substances—and it is the substratum of sensation, as we wished to prove. <125>

Sensation is the representation of a manifold in one substratum.  

Since no knowing or conceiving can be represented in which relationship and comparison, proportion and measurement—in general, relations—do not enter, the substratum of all knowing and all conceptual cognition can only be one simple substance that is not composed of substances.

Obviously, the substratum of sensation is at the same time the substratum of conceptual cognition, since, as is well-known, one ascends from sensation to conceptual cognition, and since if both substrata were not identical, both would be dependent on another substratum.

Since, as is self-evident, desiring, abhorring and willing can be represented only in a sensing and thinking substratum, the simple substance that senses and thinks is at the same time the substratum of desiring and abhorring, choosing and willing.

As the substratum of sensations, this simple substance is called *soul* [נפש]; in regard to its ability to desire and abhor, it is called *temperament* [רוח]; in regard to its being the substratum of represented in the simple. To the extent that representations of the composite in the simple are sensations, they occur on the occasion of changes in the external sense organs.” {LS}

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36 See the preceding annotation. {LS}

37 Ger.: *begriffliche Erkenntnis*. Heb.: ידיעה וההשגה. Elsewhere, *Erkenntnis* (ידיעה) is either “cognition” or “knowledge,” according to the immediate context.

38 On the Hebrew designations of the soul, cf. *Bereshit Rabbah*, ch. 14 (ed. Theodor, p. 132). Concerning the significance of the designations, cf. Saadia, *Beliefs and Opinions* VI (ed. Slucki, p. 98 [Ros 244]), who, following Plato, assumes three powers of the soul and understands by נפש the power of desire, by רוח the power of anger, and by נשמת the power of knowing; cf. also Ibn Ezra on Ecclesiastes 7:3. —“Temperament” [Ger.: *Gemüt*] is the “sum of our faculties of desire” (see JA II 326.5; cf. Adelung, s.v., and Walch, s.v.). —On the subject, cf. Wolff, VGGM §§745 and 747. {LS}
insight and conceptual cognition, it is called spirit [נפש]. But soul, temperament, and spirit are one and the same substance; for a substance that is not composed of parts cannot be broken down into pieces. Were it conceivable\(^39\) for it to be split into pieces, each of its pieces would have its isolated existence, and the togetherness of these pieces would come about outside the soul, as we have explained. As a result, it is clear that the substratum of all these powers of the soul is a single, noncomposite substance, that it is spiritual, not material; for all matter\(^40\) is composite and able to be split into pieces. <126>

ON THE IMPERISHABILITY OF THE SOUL

13

If a thing exists after having not been, it has emerged, as is said; and if after existing it is no more, it has perished, as is said.

14

The composite thing emerges when its essence emerges, that is, when its parts combine\(^41\) into an order and location corresponding to its essence; it perishes when the parts are separated from one another or when its order is destroyed.\(^42\) Therefore, it is possible for the parts to precede the emergence of the composite thing in time and to outlast its perishing. \{207\}

15

The simple thing can emerge into being only out of nothing and can perish into nothing only out of being. Nothing of it precedes its emergence, and nothing of it outlasts its perishing.

16

The simple thing does not emerge in time and it does not perish in time; but it can emerge only into being out of nothing suddenly,\(^43\) and when it perishes, it vanishes out of being into nothing suddenly, without needing time.\(^44\)

17

The composite thing can emerge suddenly and can do so in time; it can vanish suddenly and can do so in time. For as the parts come suddenly out of nothing\(^45\) into being,\(^46\) into an order


\(^40\) Ger.: Materielle. Heb.: גשמי. In the previous clause, “material” is materiell and גשמי, respectively.

\(^41\) Or: synthesize. Cf. Seele 203n11, above.

\(^42\) Cf. Leibniz, *Monadologie* §§4–6 [Wie 533 or Sch 148 or FrWo 268]; Wolff, VGGM §§89–93, and *Ontologia* §§691–702. \{LS\}

\(^43\) Perhaps after מתייה ומית הי a second מתייה is to be added, and then it is to be translated: “but when it emerges, it emerges into being out of nothing suddenly.” \{LS\}

\(^44\) Babylonian Talmud, *Rosh Hashana* 11a and *Chullin* 60a. \{LS\}

\(^45\) Ger.: Nichts. Heb.: אפס.

\(^46\) Ger.: Sein. Heb.: יש.
corresponding to the essence of the composite thing, the composite thing emerges suddenly. An example: the Eternal commanded at the time of creation, and all creatures arose out of nothing into being in their fullness and their perfection. As the parts perish suddenly out of being into nothing, the composite thing perishes suddenly. As the parts precede the emergence of the composite thing and combine by reason of local movement into an order and location corresponding to the essence of the composite thing, the composite thing emerges in time; as the parts outlast the composite thing, it perishes in time.

18

It is transparent that each limited agent acts only in time. Now since all creatures are limited and finite, they act only in time. It is impossible for any natural causes to bring something into being out of nothing or to reduce being to nothing; for this would be a sudden change, as is obvious; but natural causes act only in time. They make an entity only out of another entity, they create nothing and annihilate nothing.

19

Each sudden change that creates something out of nothing or annihilates it out of being comes about solely and wholly by dint of the mere preference of the infinite being; in the manner of a miracle, not in the manner of the course of nature on the basis of natural causes; for only in time do these make an entity out of another entity.

20

The body of a human being can emerge in time, through natural, created causes; this is the birth of the human being. It can come to its end through natural causes: if the parts out of which it is composed are separated from one another, or if their order and location corresponding to the essence of the body are destroyed, this is its death.

47 Ger.: Agens. Heb.: פועל.
48 Ger.: wirkt. Heb.: פועל.
49 Cf. Wolff, VGGM §§686ff. and 783. {LS}
50 Ger.: eingeschränkt und endlich. Heb.: שמHoward תכלת At Seele 211.12/HaNefesh 129.17 and 211.34–35/129.28, below, “finite” is eingeschränkt andحملו, respectively.
51 Ger.: natürlichen Ursachen. Heb.: מבחר תוספות.
52 Ger.: Seindes. Heb.: יש.
53 Ger.: erschaffen. Heb.: יдавать.
54 Ger.: vernichten. Heb.: יחלים.
55 Ger.: Gutfinden. Heb.: רצון.
56 Ger.: in der Weise des Wunders ... in der Weise des Laufs der Natur. Heb.: על דרך נגר ... על דרך תולדות המראים.
57 Ger.: auf Grund. Heb.: באמרתה. Generally, Grund is either “basis” or “ground” according to context.
58 Ger.: durch natürliche, erschaffene Ursachen. Heb.: על ידי מבחר טבעיות נבראים.
But the soul of the human being, which is a single, simple substance, emerges only by dint of the mere preference of the Eternal, in the manner of a miracle; it perishes only by dint of his mere preference, in a miraculous manner that transcends the causes of the course of nature. That is why no illnesses or accidents of the body or other natural causes taken together can utterly annihilate it; that is why it can never die unless its Creator annihilates it by dint of his mere preference: it cannot perish following the course of nature, but only through a miracle.

The Almighty annihilates nothing; for all acts of the Eternal are good in themselves, and if they occasionally appear bad, then it is well-known that this happens to us only as a result of our shortsightedness. In truth, if they are bad in respect of one part, they are good in respect of the totality of creatures. Were we to know all things as the Almighty knows them, we would praise him for the apparently evil occurrences; for these are only an apparent evil, as will be explained in detail in another place and as Maimonides has called attention to in his Guide of the Perplexed. The annihilation of a thing is a true evil, however, not an apparent one, as is transparent, and all acts that produce a true evil are truly bad. Therefore, the Eternal can never wish to annihilate a creature completely. It is therefore proved that the soul of a human being does not die in the natural manner when the body dies and also is never annihilated through the mere preference of its Creator, rather it is imperishable. This was what I wished to prove. <128>

ON THE TRUE LIFE OF THE SOUL

In the foregoing, it has been proved that each thinking or sentient substance is necessarily simple, spiritual, not composed out of parts, and that it can come to be only in a miraculous manner that transcends the course of nature, and perish by dint of the mere preference of an infinite being. I have further explained to you that, by dint of his mere preference, the All-benevolent does not annihilate anything, although he could annihilate it if he wished. That is why no doubt is possible from now on that the souls of human beings do not perish when the body perishes and that even the body is not fully annihilated—for the course of nature has no power for that—but dissolves into its parts, as is well-known. But since the soul is not composite, it cannot be dissolved and cannot perish at all.

59 Cf. Wolff, Psychologia rationalis §§663, 667–71, 698, 731–32. {LS}
60 Cf. Phädon 70.18–38 [Cul 73–74; Nob. 95–96]. {LS}
61 Ger.: Handlungen. Heb.: פעולות.
63 Mendelssohn has treated this subject in detail in his God’s Cause, or Providence Vindicated (see JA III.2 291–60). {LS}
64 Guide of the Perplexed III.2. {LS}
65 The Hebrew text also allows “all the consequences of a true evil,” which perhaps is preferable. {LS}
Now we must turn to the third subject of the investigation that we have had in mind, namely, the question whether we are to believe that the soul in its continuance truly lives by remaining a rational and willing substance, preserving all the faculties that it has had before its separation from its body and losing nothing of the skills and perfection that it has acquired here below as it found itself using its senses and its organs; or whether it is possible that it—the substance that is capable of conceptual cognition and moral will—sinks from its higher levels and becomes again like the soul of a small child that does not yet understand how to reject evil and choose good, so that it almost resembles the merely sentient soul of a beast; or whether it becomes again like the soul of a “premature birth that does not look on the sun,” which is even beneath the level of the small child and has not yet acquired any perfection or any skill at all.

It is well-known (see Logical Terms, chapter 4, and my commentary ad loc.) that every proposition necessarily falls under the classification according to which it is either apodictic or problematic or assertoric. An apodictic proposition is either necessary or impossible. For if the proposition in question contains a contradiction in itself or to a truth outside itself, then it is impossible, and if its contradictory is impossible, then it is necessary. A proposition is problematic if neither it itself nor its contradictory contains a contradiction. If the grounds for the problematic proposition are actual, then it is assertoric; if they are not actual, then it is merely problematic.

Now without a doubt the proposition that we are examining does not belong to the apodictic ones, i.e., it is neither necessary nor impossible. For since we have seen that the substance of the soul is imperishable, it is not impossible for the skills and concepts that it has attained, such as they are, to remain. But the opposite is also possible in itself, not impossible;

67 Ger.: vernünftige. Heb.: משכיל.
68 Ger.: wollende. Heb.: רוצה.
69 Ger.: Vermögen. Heb.: כוחות.
70 Ger.: Fertigkeiten. Heb.: כוחות.
71 Perhaps המצורע and then it is to be translated: “that it sinks from the higher levels of a substance that is capable of . . . .” {LS}
72 Psalm 58:9 (in accordance with Mendelssohn’s translation). {LS}
73 See Logik 209–11 [at www.press.uchicago.edu/sites/strauss/, loc. cit.]. {LS}
74 Ger.: Satz. Heb.: משפט.
75 Ger.: apodiktisch. Heb.: מזכר.
76 Ger.: problematisch. Heb.: אפשרי.
77 Ger.: assertorisch. Heb.: מוחלט.
78 We use the designations for the modality of judgments that have become usual only since Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason (cf. P. Hauck, “Die Entstehung der Kantischen Urteilstafel,” Kantstudien XI, 203–5), so as to be able to render the two Hebrew designations for “necessary” (מחויב and מصدق) separately in German. {LS}
79 Ger.: unmöglich. Heb.: נמנע.
80 Ger.: Widerspruch. Heb.: מצורע.
for we see that the soul of a human being who has already succeeded in thinking, at a
time when he lies in a deep sleep or at a time when he is incapacitated or when he is drunk and in
similar cases, becomes like the soul of an embryo or an infant and that the powers and skills that
he has acquired become inoperative. If this is not impossible even for only a short time, then
doubtless it contains no contradiction, whether in itself or to another truth. That is why the
doubter can object: perhaps something of the sort happens to human souls after death; perhaps
they remain in this state for all eternity.

You see, therefore, that the proposition that we are investigating, namely, that souls lead
a true life for all eternity after the death of the body and remain eternally in possession of the
skills they have acquired—this proposition is not necessary and not impossible. We only have to
settle the doubt, whether it is a merely problematic proposition or an assertoric one. How it
turns out depends on the preference and decree of the Creator: whether His wisdom has decreed
that the grounds are actual for rational living beings’ ascending higher and higher through
the acquisition of perfection and remaining in possession of this perfection and these skills for as
long as they exist, that is, eternally; or whether the Almighty has willed that they ascend
gradually from perfection to perfection for a time and afterwards sink deeper and deeper to the
level of the merely sentient and the skills that they acquired when they were still rational living
beings totally disappear. An example: if one asks at the birth of a child, “Will it have wings?”
then the answer will be, “This is impossible”; if one asks, “Will it be a finite81 substance?” then it
will be replied, “Necessarily”; but if one asks, “Will it be wise or foolish, rich or poor?” then
since none of the opposed possibilities contains a contradiction, the answer will be that it is a
factual question82 and depends on whether the Eternal has willed that the grounds for actualizing
the possibilities in question are actual or not actual. It is the same with the soul: it is impossible
for it to perish with the perishing of the body, and it is necessary for it to continue as a substance
that is somehow sentient; but no necessity determines whether its sentience will be lively and
clear or weak and confused, whether it remains in possession of the reason and free will that it
has acquired or not. Our knowledge83 about that is like our knowledge about all actual things
before their actualization. The most we can know is whether the possibility in question is fitting
to God and agrees with the rules84 of his wisdom, benevolence,85 and fidelity86 or not.

You must know that the possibilities that come up in this investigation divide into five
main classes.87

First possibility: all rational living beings remain for all eternity in the
state in which they find themselves, without changing, adding to, or taking away
from themselves. This is impossible for a finite substance, which as such is
necessarily in constant change. <130>

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81 See Seele 207n49, above.
82 Ger.: Tatsachen-Frage. Heb.: מַחְשֹׁב.
83 Ger.: Wissen. Heb.: ידיעה.
84 Ger.: Regeln. Heb.: דְּרֵשׁ. Cf. Logik 203n68.
86 Ger.: Treue. Heb.: אָחַד.
87 Cf. on this Mendelssohn’s Oracle apropos the Destiny of Man (JA VI.1 23–24). {LS}
Second possibility: all rational creatures ascend eternally from level to level and continually take on skill, perfection, virtue, and happiness, without the ascent’s ever being disrupted by a sinking back; its progress toward eternal happiness thus resembles a movement in a straight line ascending from below to above.

Third possibility: all rational creatures ascend for a time and take on skill, perfection, and happiness; afterwards they sink back to the lower level on which they were at the start before their ascent, or even deeper; they forget all cognitions and all concepts; they lose all the skills and all the moral characteristics that they acquired when they were still occupying a higher rank; they again become irrational, merely sentient living beings. In this case, the progress resembles a movement falling in a straight line from above to below.

Fourth possibility: all rational creatures ascend for a time, sink back for a time, and then ascend again up to the place at which they already were, or even higher; their progress thus resembles a movement running back and forth.

Fifth possibility: some ascend and take on perfection. Others sink back from the level of happiness that they were enjoying; the former keep getting closer to happiness, the latter keep getting further from it.

There are yet other possibilities, composed out of those named; but their enumeration would be too extensive. I have treated them extensively in my *Immortality of the Soul* and have shown that movement in a straight line is not compatible with the essence of creatures. I have adduced binding proofs that just as the Eternal would not totally annihilate any substance, so too for any skill and perfection such that they would not leave any trace and it would be as if they had never existed. For this would not correspond to the rules of wisdom and of infinite overflowing love. I have shown that the possibility that is the most fitting to God and most agrees with the rules of wisdom and justice is fidelity; just as rational living beings have begun to ascend the levels of perfection and happiness, so they will continue eternally, though they will sometimes sink back for a time, but afterwards will ascend again to joy. Everything happens according to law and justice, love and mercy, just as the highest infinite wisdom...

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88 Mendelssohn means the reply to Cebes’ objection in the Third Dialogue of the *Phädon* (cf. especially *Phädon* 106.29–107.15, 113.7–115.8, 123.3–7 [Cul 162–63, 176–81, 199; Nob 129, 134–35, 142]). There, however, he has not “shown that movement in a straight line is not compatible with the essence of the creature,” that creatures must “sometimes sink back for a time”; perhaps he had the aim of working this proof into the planned elaboration of the Third Dialogue (see IP). That human beings—the human race, at any rate, not individuals!—must sink back from time to time from the levels reached, Mendelssohn observes in his letter to Hennings of June 25, 1782 [JA XIII 64ff.]; Mendelssohn wished “not to have to go beyond” these “reflections” in his “appendix to Abbt’s correspondence” [i.e., “Annotations to Abbt’s Friendly Correspondence,” JA VI.1 27–65] and he wanted to utilize this appendix for the Third Dialogue of the *Phädon*. —The proof that Mendelssohn intended to give, Lessing came up with in a related context (LM XI 477 [Nis 52]). — Cf. on this particular question and on the whole Bilfinger, *Dilucidationes* §362. {LS}

89 Ger.: sich mit dem Wesen der Geschöpfe nicht verträgt. Heb.: התולדות מדרכי אינו.

90 Ger.: der unendlichen überströmenden Liebe. Heb.: התלמוד עם בישול הלאה.
determines it, depending on how it is fitting according to the norm of strict justice or according to the norm of mercy; for the world is judged benevolently. Only in this manner are the ways of God well-ordered; otherwise, one fate would meet the good and the evil, those who serve God and those who do not serve God; and it would be alike for the just man and the scoundrel; but it would be unworthy of the judge of the whole earth not to exercise justice. Here is not the place to dwell on this any longer.

SECOND TREATISE

INVESTIGATION INTO THE SYNTHESIS OF THE SOUL WITH THE BODY

We begin by asking about the concept of natural and mutual influence. One notices at first glance that the sense of this term depends on the definition of the categories of acting and being acted on. I have found no satisfactory definition of these categories among the ancients. Let us therefore look at whether the moderns have outdone the ancients.

A few of them say: if from the positing of A the positing of B follows, and from the elimination of A the elimination of B, then A is the agent and B is what is being acted on. For example, the sun and heat: from the positing of the existence of the sun, there follows the existence of heat; and if there is no sun, there is no heat; therefore, the sun being the agent, its effect is heat, and the heated air is what is being acted on. This explanation is nevertheless unsatisfactory; for sometimes the positing of B follows from the positing of A, and the elimination of B from the elimination of A, without A’s being the agent and B’s being what is being acted on. If, for example, A is the whole and B is a part of it, then if the whole is

91 Pirkei Avot 3.15. {LS; LS’s annotation reads 3.16} Lit.: in benevolence. Ger: in Güte. Heb.:-Nazi.
93 Cf. Ecclesiastes 9:2. {LS}
94 Cf. Genesis 18:25 (in accordance with Mendelssohn’s translation). {LS}
95 Ger.: Einfluss. Heb.: השפעה.
96 Ger.: Wirken. Heb.: יפעל.
98 Ger.: folgt. Heb.: ותעה.
99 Ger.: das Wirkende. Heb.: הפעולה.
100 Ger.: das Leidende. Heb.: הפעולה. Cf. Seele 214n97, above, and 224n173, below.
101 Ger.: Wirkung. Heb.: פעולה.
102 In the same context as here, Bilfinger’s Dilucidationes read (§249): “. . . In casu praesenti audio hoc allegari: quo posito res ponitur, sublato tollitur, id est caussa. Fallit vero regula, nisi limitetur. Accipe casum: si duo effectus sint ejusdem caussae naturaliter agentis, et effectus quidem, qui ab alia caussa non procedant, quam ab hac; sane posito uno, ponitur et alter; etsi unus non sit caussa alterius. Num illuminatio telluris, a sole facta, est causa illuminationis Saturni? Posita una, ponitur; et sublata, tollitur altera . . . necessaria est limitatio: . . . si posito
moved, the part is necessarily moved also; and if the whole rests, the part also rests; and yet the movement of the whole does not bring about\textsuperscript{103} the movement of the part; it is the same in analogous cases. Now, in order to understand the matter correctly, the concept of “following”\textsuperscript{104} must be assigned the narrower determination that not every “following” of one thing from another thing is an “effect” and a “being acted on,” but only the “following” of what is being grounded from its ground\textsuperscript{105} and of what is being caused from its cause\textsuperscript{106} is called “acting” and “being acted on.” With this, we return to our starting point; for we do not know the concept of ground\textsuperscript{107} \{215\} and what is being grounded, nor of cause and what is being caused, by which this definition is supported. For the sake of <132> greater clarity, the presuppositions must be treated in somewhat more detail than they really needed to be in the presence of a wise person\textsuperscript{9} like you, who already sees at the beginning of the conversation what will be explained at its end. But I know that your love for me is even greater than your wisdom and that the love will cover all my faults.\textsuperscript{108}

The thoughts of the soul are very closely connected, like the links of a chain.\textsuperscript{109} Partly they ground one another, partly they exclude one another. From each truth a truth follows, and each truth is the consequence\textsuperscript{110} of a truth. Each truth excludes an untruth, and vice versa. All the ways of rational inference\textsuperscript{111} in geometry, logic, etc., revolve around this midpoint. It is valid for all of them: if thought A is posited, then from it a consequence necessarily ensues, namely, a thought B; from thought B a thought C ensues, etc. (All truths are compatible with one another; none of them is in contradiction or opposition with another truth; but untruths quarrel with one another, are incompatible.)

\[A\ ponitur B, et sublato A tollitur B sic, ut ex positione vel ablatione too A posit ratio reddi positionis vel ablationis too B; tum A est caussa to B."]  \{In the present case, I hear this being alleged: if when a thing is posited it is posited, and when it is denied it is removed, it is the cause. But the rule fails unless it is limited. Take this case: if there are two effects of the same cause acting naturally, and there are effects that do not proceed from another cause besides this one, surely when the one effect\textsuperscript{9} is posited, the other is also posited, even if the one is not the cause of the other. Is the illumination of the moon that is cast by the sun the cause of the illumination of Saturn? When the one illumination is posited, the other one is posited; and when it is denied, the other one is removed. . . . A limitation is necessary: if when A is posited B is posited and when A is denied B is removed, so that by the positing or removal of A the reason is rendered for the positing or removal of B, then A is the cause of B.\} \{LS\}

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{103} Ger.: bewirkt. Heb.: לממש.
\item \textsuperscript{104} Ger.: Folgen. Heb.: 몰חל.
\item \textsuperscript{105} Ger.: des Begründeten aus seinem Grund. Heb.: המסובים מסובים.
\item \textsuperscript{106} Ger.: des Verursachten aus seiner Ursache. Heb.: מעלהו מעלה.
\item \textsuperscript{107} Cf. Seele 208n56, above.
\item \textsuperscript{108} Cf. Proverbs 10:12. \{LS\}
\item \textsuperscript{109} In this paragraph Mendelssohn develops the principle of contradiction, in the following one the principle of sufficient reason; cf. Leibniz, \textit{Monadologie} §§31ff. [Wie 539–40 or Sch 153 or FrWo 272ff.]. \{LS\}
\item \textsuperscript{110} Ger.: ist Folge. Heb.: נובע. Cf. Seele 214n83, above.
\item \textsuperscript{111} Ger.: \textit{Wege der vernünftiger Schliessens}. Heb.: דרכי התוכנה שלשלאות. Cf. Logik 203n68.
\end{itemize}
Soul and world are very closely connected with each other. That is: the connection of things actually present outside the soul is as the connection of representations in the soul\textsuperscript{112} (with the exception of the appearances, as will be explained in the following).\textsuperscript{113} If representation A has representation B as a consequence in the soul, then actual thing A has as a consequence actual thing B outside the soul. One who grasps actual thing A and its determinations grasps how actual thing B ensues outside him. On this foundation stand all the methods of inference in \textit{physics}, \textit{metaphysics} and \textit{morals}. In all these sciences, one infers from the actual to the actual by virtue of the inseparable connection between the representations of them. For example: in the soul’s representation, the strength of the sun’s effect\textsuperscript{114} is associated with heat, and its weakness with cold, and it is the same in the actual world;\textsuperscript{115} in the soul’s representation, a body whose movement is not hindered always moves in the same way, without further acceleration or slowdown,\textsuperscript{116} and it is the same \{216\} in the world. Now if by grasping the essence of A one grasps the emergence of B and grasps how A decided in favor of the being of B as against its non-being, then in the soul A is the \textit{ground} and B is \textit{what is being grounded}, and in the world A is the \textit{cause} and B is \textit{what is being caused}.\textsuperscript{117} Now if something comes to pass\textsuperscript{118} in a substance, and the ground of the process\textsuperscript{119} lies in the power of another substance, i.e., if the one who knows this power and its limits grasps the process and the manner of its initiation, then the first substance is something being acted on and the second is an agent: in this case, one speaks of \textit{transient effect}\textsuperscript{120} (\textit{actio transiens}).\textsuperscript{121} The process in the agent insofar as its ground lies in the power of the thing being acted on\textsuperscript{122} is the \textit{reaction}\textsuperscript{123} (\textit{reactio}). If the effect remains in place and position, i.e., if the ground for what is coming to pass in a substance lies in the power of this substance itself and in its antecedent\textsuperscript{124} state, then it is called \textit{immanent effect}\textsuperscript{125} (\textit{actio immanens}).

\textsuperscript{112} Cf. Spinoza’s principle, “\textit{ordo et connexio idearum est, ac ordo et connexio rerum} [the order and connection of ideas is as the order and connection of things]” (\textit{Ethics}, pt. II, prop. 7 [Geb II 89; cf. WhSt 50]), with which, as Mendelssohn asserts in the \textit{Philosophical Writings} (JA I 345.5–10 [Dah 103]), Leibniz’s doctrine agrees completely. \{LS\}

\textsuperscript{113} Seele 218.6–219.22. \{LS\}

\textsuperscript{114} Ger.: \textit{Sonnenwirkung}. Heb.: \textit{השמש פועלת}.

\textsuperscript{115} Ger.: \textit{Welt des Wirklichen}. Heb.: \textit{המצאיות יום}.

\textsuperscript{116} Ger.: \textit{ohne Beschleunigung und Verlangsamung weiter}. Heb.: \textit{איחור ou מהירה bli}.

\textsuperscript{117} In Wolff’s definition: “If a thing A contains in itself something from which it can be understood why B is, B may be something either in A or outside A; so that which is found in A is called the \textit{ground} of B; A itself is called the \textit{cause}, and B is said to be grounded in A. That is to say, the ground is that by which it can be understood why something is, and the cause is a thing that contains within itself the ground of another thing.” (VGGM §29) \{LS\}

\textsuperscript{118} Ger.: \textit{vorgeht}. Heb.: \textit{יארע}.

\textsuperscript{119} Ger.: \textit{Vorgang}. Heb.: \textit{מאורע}.

\textsuperscript{120} Ger.: \textit{übergehende Wirkung}. Heb.: \textit{יוצאת פעולה}.

\textsuperscript{121} Cf. the definitions in Baumgarten’s \textit{Metaphysica} §§211, 213, 410. \{LS\}

\textsuperscript{122} Ger.: \textit{dessen Grund in der Kraft des Leidenden liegt}. Heb.: \textit{המתפעל בכח שסבתו}.

\textsuperscript{123} Ger.: \textit{Gegenwirkung}. Heb.: \textit{חוזרת פעולה}.

\textsuperscript{124} Cf. \textit{Logik} 226n206.
For bodily things, the transient effect is natural, in the manner of a real influence; that is, there is something going out of the agent and into the thing being acted on so as to act on the latter—e.g., the heat that goes out of the heater and penetrates the parts of what is being heated; thus it is with attraction by magnets, the striking of a flint, the procreation of animals, etc. It is clear that such an influence takes place only among composite things: for a simple substance cannot be separated into parts, nothing can pass from it to another substance, nor can anything penetrate it from another substance. Nevertheless, the effect of a simple thing on another simple thing can be represented in two ways: either such that a change comes to pass in the thing being acted on, A, and the ground of this change does not at all lie in the thing being acted on, but only in the power of the agent, B—this sort of effect is called physical influence (influxus physicus); or such that B, and accordingly A, acts and is being acted on at the same time, i.e., that the representation of A is present in substance B and the representation of B is present in substance A, and the representing substances undergo an effect and a change by means of these representations, by their own power therefore and not by the power of the thing being represented; an effect of that sort is called ideal influence (influxus idealis). Let the following serve as an example: Jacob saw Rachel and fell in love with her; in this way, the figure of Rachel was imprinted in Jacob’s heart as a consequence of the seeing; as a consequence of this representation, plans, thoughts, and wishes about pleasing her were aroused in his soul; as a consequence of these, he served her father seven years as if it were only a few days.

At first glance, it seems—and a few of the philosophers assert this too—that the first representation reached Jacob by physical influence. For it did not at all lie in Jacob’s power to see that figure if it had not reached him from the external sense-object. The cause of that seeing would therefore lie in the sense-object activating the seeing, not in what was being acted on. But what came to pass afterward in the soul of the one seeing—the thoughts and wishes that took hold of him—this is not the effect of the external sense-object, but the effect of the representation by means of the powers of the soul of the seeing man. That is why whoever says, “Rachel brought about that longing in Jacob,” does not speak an untruth; for the figure of her brought about everything that then followed in his heart; but the effect happened by the power of Jacob’s soul, not by the power of the external sense-object. That is why whoever wants to speak precisely and in agreement with the actual subject matter will say, “Jacob’s powers for the activating of that longing were aroused by the representation in his soul.” An effect of this sort is called ideal influence. If likewise it also happened in Rachel’s soul that she was influenced by the representation of Jacob and fell in love with him, then one says that the effect was a harmonious ideal influence (influxus idealis harmonicus). In all this, there is no quarrel at all.

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125 Ger.: immanente Wirkung. Heb.: עומדת פעולה.
126 Cf. Leibniz, Monadologie §§7 [Wie 533–34 or Sch 148 or FrWo 268]. {LS}
127 Ger.: physischer Einfluss. Heb.: העצמת ההשפעה הפעולה.
128 Ger.: idealer Einfluss. Heb.: הל העצמת השפעת או העצם האצילית.
129 Cf. Baumgarten, Metaphysica §§211–12. {LS}
130 “Philosopher” in LS’s Seele translation is always Weltweise, which in turn is LS’s rendering of חוקר in Mendelssohn’s Hebrew. See IPM XVIII n23.
131 The Influxionists; see Seele 218.1–4. {LS}
132 Ger.: bewirkenden. Heb.: הפועל.
133 Ger.: harmonischer idealer Einfluss. Heb.: השפעת צוירית ציורית הפעולה.
among the learned. For they all grant that the representation does not act on the soul by physical influence, that therefore it is not as if everything further would come about by the power of that active representation and not by the power of the soul;\footnote{134} for obviously this would be absurd. But about the first representation and the mode and manner of how it reached the soul, the adherents of Leibniz quarrel with the rest of the philosophers. About this point there are three competing views,\footnote{135} namely: \{218\} <134>

1) the view that when the soul receives sensory representations, it is being acted on exclusively by the power of external sense-objects: the advocates\footnote{136} of this view are called Influxionists;\footnote{137}

2) the view that the external sense-object is only the occasion, not the agent, the soul being merely acted on and the true agent being God; the advocates of this view are called Occasionalists;

3) the view that the very first representation in the soul comes from its own limited power, by means of antecedent representations and in harmony with the external sense-object, that therefore between sense-object and sense there exists a harmonious ideal influence: the advocates of this view are called Harmonists.

We will speak further about them in the following.\footnote{138}

When the representation in the soul agrees with its sense-object outside the soul, one speaks of actual existence\footnote{139} (realitas). The representation that does not agree either contradicts the actuality outside the soul, or only is distinguished from it. If it contradicts the actuality, then it is named an imagination\footnote{140} (phantasma). For example, if a human being imagines that he is flying or that the sun is setting at noon, or if one is lying down and then dreams that he is up and about, etc. If the representation is distinguished from the actuality, it is called appearance\footnote{141}

\footnote{134} A better translation would be: “as if what happens by the power of that active representation did not follow by the power of the soul.” \{LS\}

\footnote{135} The distinction among these three scholarly opinions goes back to Leibniz (cf., e.g., his “Seconde éclaircissement du système de la communication des substances,” Erd 133–34 [Wie 118f.]). This division then lies at the basis of the pertinent discussion of the Wolffian school (cf., e.g., Wolff, Psychologia rationalis §553, and Baumgarten, Metaphysica §761 as well as §§448–52). Cf., for Mendelssohn, JA I 510.7–19 and annotation. \{LS\}

Fritz Bamberger’s editorial annotation to JA I 510.18 (at JA I 639 ad loc.) refers to Baumgarten, Metaphysica §§448, 450, 452, and to Baumgarten’s dependence on Wolff, VGGM §§761ff.

\footnote{136} Ger.: Vertreter. (LS interpolates this word into his translation.) Cf. IMH xivn21.

\footnote{137} The designations “Influxionists,” “Occasionalists” and “Harmonists” are offered in the Hebrew original as translations of the respective Hebrew expressions [עֱלִיָּהּ הַחֲפֻלָה...עֱלִיָּהּ הַחֲפֻלָה...עֱלִיָּהּ הַחֲפֻלָה]. \{LS\}

\footnote{138} On this, cf. Evidenz 309.25–311.17 [Dah 290–91]. \{LS\}

\footnote{139} Ger.: wirkliches Dasein. Heb.: וְשִׁיתָא אֲשֶׁר שָׁמָּה.

\footnote{140} Ger.: Einbildung. Heb.: עִנָּיִית.

\footnote{141} Ger.: Erscheinung. Heb.: עִנָּיִית.
(phaenomenon). Let the representation of the moon, its rays and its glow, serve as an example of this. In truth, the moon has no glow and no rays; but its status vis-à-vis the sun and the eye of its observer conditions this appearance. Thus it is with the rainbow, which is a consequence of the status of the clouds vis-à-vis the sun.

There is an essential distinction between imagination and appearance. For the imagination has no foundation at all in actuality; it is merely a mode of the perceiving soul that represents to itself a thing that is not, as if it were. But the appearance has a foundation in actuality, albeit such that its being outside the soul is not in every respect similar to its being in the soul; for the limited power of the \{219\} soul changes the representations of things, which therefore do not always remain as they really are. (Appearance, in accordance with its essence, stands midway between actuality and representation, and depends on both. For appearance emerges when a finite soul’s power of representation enters into relation with an actual thing outside the soul; and when the thing that is being perceived by the senses or the limit of the power of representation changes, then the appearance changes also. E.g., color in accordance with its essence depends on two factors: on real light and on the power of sight. Color emerges when the power of sight comes into contact with real light; and when the light or the seeing is changed, the color is changed also. Thus it is with sound, smell, and the like. Thus, when a prophet sees an image that arouses terror or hears a voice talking, and in similar cases, one speaks of appearance.\footnote{142} For the representations in his soul have a foundation in the actuality outside the soul; but they undergo a modification, so that their being in the soul is not in every respect similar to the actuality outside the soul. I will not dwell on this any longer; for here is not the place for it; I merely wanted to explain in what manner the noun “appearance” is used.)

The essence and all determinations of the \textit{power of representation}\footnote{143} (vis \textit{repraesentativa}) are \textit{reality}, not \textit{appearance}. For the appearance emerges when the perceiver comes into contact with the perceived in such a manner that the representation of the perceived undergoes a certain change as a result of a deficiency\footnote{144} in the power of the perceiver. But when the power of representation perceives itself, it is perceiver and perceived at the same time; it is impossible for its representation to suffer a change from the side of the perceiving power, since it itself is the latter. There is no doubt, therefore, that the power of representation in the soul has a true \textit{existence}, is not an appearance. This too is not contested by even a single philosopher.

The essence and determinations of \textit{color} are \textit{appearances}, not \textit{reality}. It is well-known that what exists of it in actuality is only the effect of light and its reception by the eye of the one seeing, which can be strong or weak, quick or slow.\footnote{220} That effect is transmitted from the eye to the brain by means of the nerves; that effect is therefore a movement. With its transmission to the power of representation, the movement undergoes a modification in the soul and becomes a visual image or color, i.e., an appearance. It is the same with smell, sound, and taste. In the actuality outside the soul, there are only extended substances, which are in motion and cause a movement in the sense organs, strong or weak, fast or slow, sustained or unsustained. When this movement has reached the brain, it becomes the sense perception of a taste, a sound, or a smell, depending on the organ in which the movement emerged that was first caused by the sense-

\footnote{142} The word חזיון, which is used by Mendelssohn in the sense of “appearance,” comes up in the Bible with the meaning of “vision.” \{LS\}
\footnote{143} Ger.: Vorstellungskraft. Heb.: 
\footnote{144} Ger.: Mangel. Heb.: 

object. Outside the soul, therefore, color, sound, and smell are according to their essence nothing but moved bodies.

About bodies and movement themselves, a quarrel has emerged among the modern philosophers, namely about whether according to their essence they are reality or appearance. And, moreover, Leibniz and his adherents assert that extension (extension) is an appearance of many substances that are united and are acting and being acted on; there are actually nothing but simple substances (monades), which are unextended; the essence and all modes of the body are only an appearance of the soul’s, and they have their foundation in the modes of the united monads and in the ordering of their unification and their changes; thus the effect of a body on another body is only an appearance of the effect of the monads on one another. For the monads of which the bodies are composed coexist; therefore, there lies in the mode and manner of their coexistence an ordering of the composite; this ordering is the where. To the extent that they change, they act and are being acted on and thereby unite; but they do not combine so as to become completely one; for there exists among them a distinction of essence that is grounded in the power of each monad. Now when the soul sees many things that are united with one another without forming a true unity, it is glimpsing something extended. As the monads change, their modes vary with one another; therein lies the when.

Time is the relationship of everything actual with regard to the when. Space is the relationship of everything actual with regard to the where. Of things that act on one another directly, it is said that they touch; if they act on one another through few intermediaries, they are called “near,” if through many intermediaries, they are called “distant.”

As the modes of things change, their relationships change. That is why they change when the monads change their relationships to the things that are together with them in space. That is, the direct agent becomes the indirect agent, and vice versa; therefore, the near becomes the distant and the distant becomes the near. When we perceive a change of this sort in a body, which as such is an aggregate of monads, we then say of it that it “moves from place to place.” Therefore, movement too is appearance, not reality. The power of movement is likewise an appearance in what is composite; it has its foundation in the powers of the unified monads.
monads and resembles these but not in every respect. For there is not the phenomenal movement
in simple substances which we see in composite ones, but they change in the manner appropriate
to them. From this change follows the change of relationship of each monad to all that exist
together with it. The appearance of the change of relationship in the composite of monads—this
is phenomenal movement.

But how is it with the power and the modes of the monads?

It is well-known that according to the view of this school the universe\textsuperscript{157} is a unified
being of the highest perfection.\textsuperscript{158} That is why all its parts are connected with one another very
closely, they act on one another and are being acted on by one another. There is not one among
them that does not act on all and is not being acted on by every single one of them. In view of its
acting on them all, it contains something that grounds them all; and in view of its being acted on
by them all, it contains something that is grounded in them. That is why each monad contains
something by which the essence of all the things that exist together with it can be known. Since
the modes of the monad that harmonize with the modes of the many monads that exist together
with it \textsuperscript{222} are called perceptions, monads belong to the genus of perceiving beings, and the
power stamped into them is a power of thinking or representing, i.e., a desire and endeavor to
perceive; it is limited by the perceptions that are antecedent and simultaneous in time. That is
why the power of the monads is a power of thinking or representing. We have already explained
that this power has, without any doubt, actual existence.\textsuperscript{159}

What it is in the monads by which the essence of all the substances that exist together
with it can be understood is the representation of these substances. This representation limits the
power and the desire of the representing substance. This power acts only commensurately with
the representation of the substances that exist together with it. So in each substance there is a
representation of the remaining substances by which the power and desire of the representing
substance is limited. That is why monads act on one another by means of ideal influences and
there exists among them a harmonious connection\textsuperscript{160} (nexus harmonicus).

All this is so according to Leibniz’s view. His opponents say:\textsuperscript{161} extension is reality, not
appearance; it is a determination of the essence of the extended\textsuperscript{162} that belongs to it necessarily;
time, space, and movement \textsuperscript{137} also exist in the real world; there are no unextended
substances in the world except the souls of rational beings and what is of that\textsuperscript{163} mode; but the
elements of what is material are material.

Now is the time to speak of the connection of the soul with the body, for which purpose I
have premised all these discussions. I myself know that I am not bringing up anything new and
that everything I am saying is well-known to you, dearest friend! For your understanding leaves

\textsuperscript{157} Ger.: das Weltganze. Heb.: כלכלל.
\textsuperscript{158} See above all Monadologie §§14, 15, 52 and 61 [Wie 535, 543, 545, or Sch 149–50, 156,
157–58, or FrWo 269, 275, 276], as well as Système nouveau de la nature §14 [Wie 114–15 or
ArGa 143–44]. \{LS\}
\textsuperscript{159} See Seele 219.23–34, above. \{LS\}
\textsuperscript{160} Ger.: harmonische Verknüpfung. Heb.: זוגי קשר.
\textsuperscript{161} Cf. above all Clarke’s polemic against Leibniz (see especially Erd 753 and 759 [Ar 18, 29–
30]). \{LS\}
\textsuperscript{162} Ger.: eine Wesensbestimmung des Ausgedehnten. Heb.: ממדמה של מהפשת.
\textsuperscript{163} Lit.: their.
nothing unfathomed. But since I see that with respect to the aforementioned connection your thoughts are not far removed from mine, I have decided to set forth certain axioms and fundamental propositions as a goad, so that we may know at what point our differences of opinion emerge. Once we have arrived at this point, we will doubtless unite in one view. \(\text{\textit{223}}\)

It is well-known to every discerning person¹ that the representations and desires of every soul harmonize with the movements of the body that belongs to it, and thus the movements of the body harmonize with the representations of the soul. About this there is no doubt or quarrel whatsoever. But there is some question whether the representations in the soul emerge out of antecedent representations by virtue of the power of thinking of the soul itself, or whether they do so by virtue of the power of the body and the sense-organs; and accordingly, whether the movements in the body have their ground in other movements by which they are produced by virtue of the power of movement of the body, or whether they have their ground in the power of the soul. The views of the philosophers diverge on this, corresponding to the three contrasting learned opinions mentioned above.¹⁶⁷

The Influxionists say: the movement of the soul brings about a movement in the body, and the movement in the body brings about sensory representations in the soul. This is the view of Aristotle and his adherents.¹⁶⁸ Since in their view the movement is something real, not an appearance, and therefore the essence of the movement is distinguished at the highest level from the essence of the representation—for movement is a mode of matter, and representation is a mode of spirit—it is very hard to understand how, of two extremely distinct things, the one can be a ground and the other what is grounded, the one a cause and the other what is caused.¹⁶⁹ For in their view the movement is the cause of the representation, and the representation or the desiring connected with the representation is the cause of the movement. Now it lies in the nature of a ground and what is grounded that whoever knows the essence of the ground also grasps the essence of what is grounded by it. That is why¹⁷⁰ what is more surprising than the

¹⁶⁴ The original Hebrew contains an allusion to Job 28:3. We follow here the translation by Salomon Anschel [\textit{op. cit.}, \textit{Seele} 203n1, above]. {LS}

¹⁶⁵ Cf. Ecclesiastes 12:11 \{LS\}

¹⁶⁶ Wolff, in his introduction to the discussion of the synthesis between body and soul, also starts from the premise that the harmony is an uncontestable fact of experience: “harmoniam mentis et corporis dari palam est, nec quisquam eandem in dubiam vocare potest” [that the harmony of mind and body exists is plain, and no one can doubt it] (\textit{Psychologia rationalis} §541). As a fact of experience, the harmony between the soul and the body is the object of empirical psychology; the task of rational psychology is the explanation of the phenomenon of the harmony; with regard to the explanation, quarrel rages among the three learned opinions (mentioned at \textit{Seele} 218.1–14). Cf. also Baumgarten, \textit{Metaphysica} §§733ff. and 761. {LS}

¹⁶⁷ See \textit{Seele} 218.1–14, above. {LS}

¹⁶⁸ Cf. Leibniz, “Troisième éclaircissement du système de la communication des substances” (Erd 135 [ArGa 148]): “\textit{La voye de l’influence est celle de la philosophie vulgaire. . .}” [The way of influence is that of the common philosophy. . .]. {LS}

¹⁶⁹ On this critique, cf. Leibniz, \textit{Theodicée} §59 [Hug 155], and in Wolff’s \textit{Psychologia rationalis}, especially §574; further, Bilfinger, \textit{Dilucidationes} §323. {LS}

¹⁷⁰ Better: “But.” {LS}
The occasionalists—the students of Descartes—say: the single agent for all things is God; all creatures behave merely passively; they possess the disposition to receive an effect, but no active power at all. This view appears very odd to us; for a mere disposition has no actual existence—for it is not—but it is appropriate to a substratum that is for the possibility of change and being acted on to be represented in it. This substratum that is is in

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171 Cf. Wolff, *Psychologia rationalis* §§589–90. The system of occasional causes is described in the Wolffian school in general as Cartesian; Wolff himself says: “Cartesii auctoritate accessit systema causarum occasionalium” [the system of occasional causes is attached to the authority of Descartes] (*Psychologia rationalis* §553); see, further, Bilfinger, *Dilucidationes* §333n, which tries to justify this description in the face of a critic. About the relationship of the Cartesians to Descartes himself, cf., e.g., Leibniz, *Système nouveau de la nature* §12 [Wie 113 or ArGa 142–43 or FrWo 149]. {LS}

172 Or: as something acted on. Ger.: *leidend*. Heb.: מַמְשֶׁלִים. Cf. Seele 214n83 and 214n86, above.

173 Cf. *Phädon Anhang* 3 144.12ff. and Annotation. — Leibniz emphasizes, in the same context as here: “jusqu'ici rien n'a mieux marqué la substance que la puissance d'agir [nothing so far has characterized substance better than the power to act].” (Erd 460); cf. further *Théodicée* §30 [Hug 140–41]. {LS}

LS’s Annotation to *Phädon Anhang* 3 144.12–145.14 reads: “... This passage, which is found only in the 3rd edition [of the *Phädon*], was prompted by Riedel’s critique of the 2nd edition. In this critique, one reads: ‘I should almost not venture to doubt whether all the primordial powers of nature are really always effective, always living, after the honorable author has said that this principle is so perspicuous to sound commonsense as to need no proof and the philosophers of all times would have thought so.’ Should the principle that the powers of nature are always effective ‘be proved,’ then either it would have to be shown (not from an arbitrary concept of power) that the activity of power cannot be divided and that each power is a *conatus*; or it would have to be confirmed by a careful physical induction that no merely passive capability of movement is found in nature. It has always been known that an effective thing (that is, whose power is a *conatus*), if it is not checked, produces the activity most appropriate to it; but perhaps it has not always been known that each thing is an effective thing and that there are no passive powers whose whole power is impenetrability and *vis inertiae*. If an arbitrary concept of power were granted and it is explained in general as an effort to act, then the principle is easily proved: but it is also no more and no less valid than the arbitrary idea in which it was wrapped up beforehand so as to be unwrapped again as needed. And besides, in this case it will be hard to prove that all substances have such a power.” Further: ‘Changeable: this means that it can be changed; as little does it follow from this that it is constantly changed, as that *to be* can be inferred from *to be able*.’ ([Philosophische Bibliothek, 1769.] 61–64). — On the distinction between ‘power’ and ‘mere possibility,’ cf. in Leibniz, above all, *De primae philosophiae emendatione* (Erd 122 [Sch 82–83]).” (Interpolations in parentheses are LS’s. Riedel’s word for “philosophers” is *Weltweise*; see IPM XVIII23. “Passive” is *leidende*; cf. Seele 214n97 and 214n100, above. “Wrapped up” and “unwrapped” here are *entwickelte* and *herauszwickeln*, respectively. The Latin terms *conatus* and *vis inertiae* here mean “striving” and “inertia,” respectively. On LS’s bibliographic source for Riedel’s critique, see JA III.1 410, item 12.)
no manner something being acted on, but is a power and effort to act. That is, the active power exists, and for as long as it exists it is in constant, never interrupted efficacy;\textsuperscript{174} for if it were interrupted, there would remain of it only the possibility of acting, and a mere possibility has no existence. If therefore God had not imparted to creatures powers that are always effective,\textsuperscript{175} they would not exist at all. Each substance is therefore active, and each changeable substance is active and being acted on at the same time.

The Influxionists, of whom I have spoken, are beset with another difficulty.\textsuperscript{176} Namely, we see that movement follows general laws,\textsuperscript{177} from which it never deviates notwithstanding all modes of pressure, propulsion, and tension. All these have their designated general rules,\textsuperscript{178} which are hammered into the nature of creatures like fixed nails\textsuperscript{179} and by virtue of which the universe\textsuperscript{180} is of the highest beauty and perfection.

The most general of these laws are the following:

1) The transient effect from the agent to what is being acted on is equal to the reaction of what is being acted on to the agent.
2) The quantity\textsuperscript{181} of the reaction\textsuperscript{182} is equal at all times. E.g., if body A is propelled northward, then after the propulsion it must either return southward or slow its movement northward, depending on how much\textsuperscript{183} it accelerated the movement of the body being propelled.
3) If one multiplies the moved bodies by the quadratic of their velocity and divides the product by the time, one obtains the quantity of living power. This is the same at each moment, both before the propulsion and after the propulsion.\textsuperscript{184}

\textsuperscript{174} Ger.: existiert in beständiger, nie aussetzender Wirksamkeit. Heb.: כל המחלות בחל המרשים כללו.
\textsuperscript{175} Ger.: wirksame. Heb.: פעילות.
\textsuperscript{176} Cf. Leibniz, Theodicee §61 [Hug 156–57], and Wolff, Psychologia rationalis §§576–79. {LS}
\textsuperscript{177} Ger.: allgemeine Gesetze. Heb.: כללים חוקים.
\textsuperscript{178} Ger.: bestimmten allgemeinen Regeln. Heb.: כלים כלליים דרכים.
\textsuperscript{179} Allusion to Isaiah 41:7 and Ecclesiastes 12:11. {LS}
\textsuperscript{180} Ger.: das Weltall. Heb.:ibaba. Cf. Seele 221n157, above.
\textsuperscript{181} Ger.: Quantität. Heb.:כמות.
\textsuperscript{182} Reactio is offered as the translation for נגודה in the Hebrew\textsuperscript{6} original. [LS has rendered the Hebrew term into German here as “Reaktion.”] The sentence thus makes no sense. In an earlier passage (Seele 216.13), the original offers reactio as the translation for פעילות ומרשים. Since פעילות also comes up immediately before our passage—we have translated the expression in Seele 216.24 as “Gegenwirkung” [reaction]—it does not appear ruled out that “reactio” belongs generally to the previous line. Perhaps is miswritten or misprinted for ומרשים (“Bewegung” [movement]), which was the word to have been expected in the context. {LS}
\textsuperscript{183} I.e., the propulsion.
\textsuperscript{184} Here too the text cannot be in order. In any case, the sentence in the present form is meaningless. The quantity of living power is equal to (half) the product of the mass and the quadratic of the velocity; if this product were further divided by time, then it could not be the same “at each moment.” {LS}
Now if a movement were to emerge in the body by virtue of the desiring in the soul, then all these laws would be annihilated; for there would then exist a transient effect without any reaction, and there would emerge a movement from one side without a movement from the opposite side. And the quantity of living power of which we have spoken would undergo an increase. But it does not correspond to the course of nature to deviate right or left from the general rules that make up the perfection and mastery of the whole of Creation. Any deviation from the general rule would be a miracle, not a natural process.

You seem to want to say: all those rules and laws are valid only in regard to physical movement, but the movement of the will does not follow these laws; since we have no valid proof for them, it is not impossible that matters are entirely different with the movement of the will than with physical movement. So runs your objection perhaps, dearest friend! But obviously it is inadequate. For, as I have already said, it is not the mode of nature to change general laws. Further: if, e.g., the increase of living power were merely an effect of the longing, as you have remarked, and the longing or desiring alone were the ground of movement, longing could accomplish whatever it wanted; there would exist for it no barrier to increasing the power of the movement, whether by little or by much, entirely according to its need. Meanwhile we see that a human being sometimes wishes to do something and it seems to him too difficult, that therefore the ability to move the body does not always harmonize with the desire, as would have to be the case if the increase in power were the effect of the desiring alone, and will and longing alone were the ground of voluntary movement.185

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185 Just as Mendelssohn does here, Bilfinger polemicizes against the doctrine of physical influence in his *Dilucidationes* (§327): Nostra autem haec illatio (sc., contra influxum physicum) esto: 1. Noverimus per experientiam: Pro motu in corpore majori . . . repraesentationem ejus . . . esse majorem: et similiter pro appetitu fortiori, motum quoque vehementior. 2. Repraesentationis illius gradus non pendere ex arbitrio voluntatus, neque gradum motus simpliciter ex appetitu; sed posse aliqua sic velle animum, ut sequantur in corpore; aliqua non item. Quis nescit exempla? 3. Neque tertio hunc defectum motus pendere ex defectu appetitus; sed appetitu licet fortissimo, tamen non consequi effectum. Veniamus nunc in rem presentem. In quocumque entium genere effectus non semper tantus est, quantus serio intenditur, ibi datur proportio inter vires ad effectum applicatas, et quantitatem ipsios effectus. Ille igitur effectus non dependet a viribus, cum effectu quoad proportionem incomparabilibus. Atqui vires animi et corporis sunt quoad proportionem incomparabiles. Ergo effectus, quales in corpore movendo experimur, non procedunt a viribus animae. Ergo anima non movet effective corpus suum . . . Non esse proportionem inter vires et nisum animae, atque motum et resistentium corporis facile probo. Quid est proportio? Est duorum homogenorum secundum magnitudinem comparatio. Homogenea vero sunt, quorum unum aliquoties repetitum potest fieri id, quod est alterum, aequare illud, vel superare. Num anima et corpus sunt homogenea? Num illorum attributa, motus et appetites? . . . [Now this argument of ours against physical influence would be: (1) We know by experience that, in the case of movement in a larger body, the representation of it is larger, and, similarly, in the case of a stronger appetite, the movement is also more vehement. (2) The size of that representation does not depend on free will, nor is the size of the movement simply according to the appetite; but the mind can wish some things so that they follow in the body, but not other things. Who does not know examples? (3) Nor, third, does this lack of movement depend on a
Now you could say: the ground of the movement of the will is not mere will and mere longing, but the strength or weakness of the representation; just as it does not lie in the capacity\(^{186}\) of the human being to increase or decrease the strength of the representation at will, so it does not lie in his capacity to increase the power of the movement arbitrarily; for the strength of the movement corresponds to the strength of the representation; that is why the movement is sometimes too difficult for the longing, namely, when the longing strives for an effect that is too strong in relationship to the representation of the soul. Nevertheless all this avails nothing; for there exists no relationship whatsoever as regards strength and weakness\(^{226}\) between representation and movement such that one could say that the strength of representation A brought about an increase of power B, since a relationship can be represented only between similar things, but not between ones that are altogether different.

However, in your view, dear friend, and according to what is implied by your words, movement is nothing real. You agree on this point with the adherents of Leibniz\(^{187}\) that it is a consequence of the power of the monads and that this power is of the genus of the power of thought except that it stays on a lower level than the latter.\(^{188}\) That is why you do not deem it ruled out for one monad to arouse another and cause thoughts in it, for the power of thinking imprinted in it to undergo a change by that means, and for movement in place to emerge in bodies from this happening to many substances. With this view, we escape many of the aforementioned difficulties.

This is a short sketch of your view about the ways in which the mode of synthesis of the soul with the body would have to be explained. But the issue\(^{189}\) is in need of further explanation. In my view, my friend, you also agree with me that movement is not the cause of the representation, but an appearance in the soul that emerges when, as we said\(^{190}\) the soul perceives many things that are united and whose on-site interrelationship\(^{191}\) changes. It is indeed correct that the power of the monads is of the genus of the power of thinking, and their endeavor to act is of the genus of desiring and will, as you, my friend, have written me in your last letter. But nevertheless this primordial desiring does not bring about spatial distancing or nearing; for space lack of appetite; but the appetite may be very strong and yet the effect not follow. Let us now come to the present matter. In any genus of entities where the effect is not always as great as is seriously intended, there exists a ratio between the power applied to the effect and the quantity of that effect. The effect, therefore, does not depend on the power when it is an effect not comparable in ratio. Therefore, the effects as we experience them in the moving body do not proceed from the power of the soul. Therefore, the soul does not effectively move its own body. . . . That there is no ratio between the power and effort of the soul and the movement and resistance of the body, I prove easily. Comparisons are between two things that are homogeneous in quantity. But homogeneous things are those of which one can sometimes become a stand-in for what the other is, to equal or surpass it. Are body and soul commensurate? Are their attributes, movements and appetites? . . .] {LS}

\(^{186}\) Ger.: \textit{Macht}. Heb.: \textit{יכולות}.
\(^{187}\) See above, \textit{Seele} 220.15–221.24. {LS}
\(^{188}\) Cf. \textit{Monadologie} §19 [Wie 536–37 or Sch 130–31 or FrWo 270]. {LS}
\(^{189}\) Ger.: \textit{die Sache}. Heb.: \textit{דברים}.
\(^{190}\) See above, \textit{Seele} 221.6–24. {LS}
\(^{191}\) Ger.: \textit{Lage-Verhältnis}. Heb.: \textit{יחס מצב}. 
and all its determinations are an appearance in the soul, and distance and nearness belong to the determinations of space. Now if the love and hatred that are contained in that primordial desiring are real, how could they bring about the appearance of distance or nearness, i.e., changes in phenomenal space? Up till now, dear <140> friend, you have not yet explained to me your view about the essence, source, and emergence of appearance, nor how in your view substances combine with one another, whether all substances or only a few of them are subject to an influence,192 {227} etc. Without these particular points of doctrine, one cannot understand your meaning, one can neither agree with it nor raise objections to it.

Now as for as your assertion that it is not impossible for one monad to act on another and arouse thoughts in it, you must first explain whether you mean that sense-object A arouses thoughts in substance B, or that the representation of that A arouses thoughts in substance B. If you are speaking of the sense-object, then you cannot escape the difficulty of what the real influence is composed of, namely that something has to proceed from the agent and enter into what is being acted on. But if you mean the representation, then you come near Leibniz’s view. However, Leibniz goes further and says:193 the change of thought in substance B takes place merely by virtue of the power of this substance, limited as it is by the representation of substance A, and this is the effect of the ideal influence of which we have spoken above. Leibniz therefore does not deny the arousal of thoughts of which you have spoken, my friend; but in his opinion this arousal does not proceed from the sense-object, but from the representation of the sense-object in the substance being aroused and, moreover, by virtue of the power imprinted in the substance being aroused. For the powers of substances change in correspondence with their representations, and their representations change when their sense-objects change, in the manner of the harmony, not of the influence. This is his view of the effect of all substances194 on one another, as I have mentioned above. About the body of a human being in particular, he says195 that the monads united in it change, by virtue of the power imprinted in them, commensurately with their representation of the location of the remaining monads in the world and of the modes of the soul, which dwells among them as a king among his entourage.196 The soul also changes, by virtue of the power imprinted in it, commensurately with its representation of its location in the world and of the modes of the monads surrounding it (that is, as we have said,197 of the monads acting on it directly; for even the surrounding is an appearance). But the soul surpasses all the monads united in the body in the degree of its power of perception; for it perceives itself and all the monads united in the body {228} more clearly and more perfectly than any of these do. By means of the monads united in the body, it also knows the remaining parts of Creation. For these are very closely connected with one another, such that whoever perceives a part of it perceives at the same time everything—albeit with differences of degree: perception being clearer and more distinct with some, and more obscure and confused with others, as is well-known. Those parts of the body by means of which the soul knows the remaining parts of

192 Ger.: ein Einfluss unterliegen. Heb.: מושפעות.
193 Cf. Seele 220.15–221.24, above. {LS}
194 The original has ציורים (“representations”), which makes no sense. {LS}
196 Allusion to Job 29:35. {LS}
197 See Seele 221.2–5, above. {LS}
Creation most clearly are called sense organs\textsuperscript{198} (organa sensuum). The soul perceives, in a lively way,\textsuperscript{199} everything that befalls the body, so that it rejoices when it perceives its perfection and health—this is sensual pleasure (voluptas sensualis)—and is sad when it perceives its imperfection and destruction—this is sensual pain\textsuperscript{200} (dolor).\textsuperscript{201}<141>

The Creator of the All has established this harmony between soul and body in such\textsuperscript{a} a manner that all movements of the body harmonize with the representations and desires of the soul, and vice versa. For movement is the appearance of a change of relationship among the united monads; and the connection of appearances in the world of appearance is as the connection of actual things in the world of reality.\textsuperscript{202} Therefore, since the modes of the monads united in the body are connected with the modes of the soul, the appearances that make up the movement in the body are also inseparably connected with the modes of that monad that is the soul of the human being.

Accordingly, phenomenal movement emerges only out of antecedent phenomenal movement. It has its foundation in the changes of the monads united in the body. These changes are the effect of the power of thinking present in those monads and limited by antecedent representations. The effect of the power of thinking present in the monads of the body harmonizes with the remaining parts of Creation, and above all with the changes of the rational soul. Its effect has the character of an ideal influence, i.e., the effect of the power of thinking present in the substances of the body is ordered in correspondence with the representations of the rest of the monads in the world;\textsuperscript{229} and especially, in a more perfect manner, in correspondence with the representations in the rational soul. In turn, the changes of the rational soul are ordered in correspondence with the changes of the powers of the monads united in the body, their locations and the mode and manner of their connection with the remaining substances in the world. This is what the aforementioned philosopher means by his assertion that there exists between bodies and the soul only a preestablished harmony.\textsuperscript{203}

I have further seen that you are indignant about this opinion, since in your view it does away with free will and reduces everything to predestination,\textsuperscript{204} so that no place remains for just reward and punishment. But in my view it is not so. Allow me now to lay this out for you, and you, my friend, look on and judge.

A being that is endowed with free will\textsuperscript{205} must know itself, the object of choice and the purpose whose actualization is expected from this object.\textsuperscript{206} For by itself it inclines its power of

\textsuperscript{198} Ger.: Gliedmaßen der Sinne. Heb.: כלים חושיים.
\textsuperscript{199} Ger.: mit Lebhaftigkeit. Heb.: בהרגשה.
\textsuperscript{200} Ger.: die sinnliche Lust . . . die sinnliche Unlust. Heb.: הנוגע המגפי . . . הנוגע המגפי.
Elsewhere in Seele, sinnlich is “sensory.”
\textsuperscript{201} Cf. Empfindungen 278–79 and 313–14 [Dah 45–47, 78–79]. \{LS\}
\textsuperscript{202} The original has “in the sensory world”), which makes no sense; we read: בוגלוים (“in the sensory world”). {LS}
\textsuperscript{203} Ger.: praestabilierte Harmonie. Heb.: מראש מיוסדת זווגית הסכמה.
\textsuperscript{204} Ger.: die Vorherbestimmung. Heb.: מקדם החורצה הגזרה.
\textsuperscript{205} Ger.: Ein Wesen, das mit Willensfreiheit begabt ist. Heb.: הבוחר החפשי (Elsewhere, Wesen is “essence”; later in this paragraph, “being” is, as usual, Sein.)
\textsuperscript{206} [For the following,] cf. Leibniz, Theodicee §§22, 34–35, and 45–46 [Hug 136–37, 143, and 148–49], as well as Evidenz 317.23ff. [Dah 297] \{LS\}
desiring to that thing because this purpose seems good to it. That is why free will is not interfered with, unless the inclination of the power of desire does not spring from knowledge of the purpose or from its seeming good to the one choosing. But that the one who wills chooses something that does not seem good to him contradicts the essence of will. For in that case the inclination of the desire would be accidental, not a free choice; for a thing is accidental if it has no ground that decided in favor of its being rather than its nonbeing; I mean if it cannot be grasped how and why it emerged and what decided in favor of its being. Now if it were possible for someone to choose something that did not seem good to him, then there would be nothing in his thoughts by which it could be grasped how and why the choice fell out this way rather than that. It cannot even be said that the ground of the choice and of the decision lay outside the soul of the human being choosing; for if that were so, he would not be choosing, but forced. Since his choice would therefore have no ground, it would be utterly accidental; and this is obviously absurd. There is therefore no choice except through the will, and this is the inclination of reason toward a thing on the ground of knowledge that the purpose of this thing is good. Will and desire are of one genus; in the case of will, however, knowledge of the good is rational knowledge, in the case of desire, on the other hand, it is only sensory knowledge, which is inferior to the rational. Sometimes will conflicts with desire, namely, when the rational knowledge is contrary to the sensory knowledge. Then it appears as if the human being has chosen something that does not appear good to him. For when, e.g., desire is victorious over will, the human being knows very well that he is doing what is not good, and nothing forces him into this act, and yet he does not refrain from it. But the discerning person grasps that this choice did not come about because the one who chose wished something that seemed bad to him, but because he let himself be misled by the desire, as we have mentioned.

When the will has decided that something should be or not be, the process of free choice has come to an end. The bodily act that follows from this choice is called a free act only in regard to its being the effect of free will; i.e., in regard to its coming about if the one who wills wishes it and its not coming about if the one who wills does not wish it. But it is all the same whether that bodily effect ensues from the body’s power of willing or whether the soul also has a power to move the body. For even this power to move would not be free; for freedom is appropriate only to the will’s resolve, to nothing else. Enough—that act does not come about unless the will inclines to it and chooses it; it is called free with regard to this, regardless of whether it comes about by virtue of the body’s power of movement in correspondence with the representations of the monads united in it and is therefore the result of an ideal influence, or whether one ascribes to the soul a further power to move bodies besides the power of thinking and asserts that the bodily act ensues from it by means of a physical influence. Free will is not enhanced or interfered with by either of these.

Not even predestination does away with free will; for it would have to destine a thing to happen regardless of whether it seems good or bad to the one who chooses. Even so, many people say that any exertion is illusory and useless, since everything happens by

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208 Ger.: Erkenntnis. Heb.: הכרה.
209 Ger.: im Gegensatz . . . steht. Heb.: ינידן.
210 [For the following,] cf. Leibniz, Theodicée §§55, 59, 64 [Hug 153, 155, 157–58] and Causa Dei §§104ff. [Sch 136–37]. {LS}
For in their way of thinking destiny makes exertion impossible; they see it as if a being endowed with free will could not do what seems good to it, if it is predestined that the latter will not be done. In our opinion, however, this is a flimsy and obviously absurd thought. Destiny is never opposed to human exertion; for nothing prevents free will from doing what seems good to it, since the choice of the will is based only on the representation of the purpose and on nothing else, and predestination is no ground for the will and does not act on it, but only harmonizes with it always. Thus nothing happens through the will in any case that would not happen by destiny; but nevertheless destiny is not the ground of the will, but the representation of the purpose and of its beneficence alone moves the will to choose and to refuse, to love and to hate.

Now it could be asked: what difference does it make whether destiny is the ground of the will and of choice or not? Nothing happens through the will that does not happen by destiny anyway; is the one who chooses therefore not free in his acts, but forced, since it is impossible for him to do away with destiny; is there therefore no justice in retribution and punishment?

Here we have come to a problem with which all investigators have been concerned, namely, with the compatibility of free will and foreknowledge. In my modest opinion, courage has abandoned the most virtuous here, only because of the confusion of the concept of necessity and freedom, as well as of the concept of retribution. I have already spoken concerning it above in explaining the concept of free will and showing that destiny does not contradict it. What goes for predestination also goes for foreknowledge.

But as for retribution, in my way of thinking vindictive punishment is a delusion, i.e., God does not repay evil in evildoers in order to avenge himself, as the adherents of vindictive punishment assert; for it would not correspond to right and justice to increase evil in the world for no purpose. Because that fool has sinned and brought evil into the world, should the judge add evil to evil? That would be unworthy of him. Should punishment, which is an evil of pain and suffering, be added to sin, which is a moral evil?

In my view, this way of thinking is truly very distant from the meaning of the Torah and the fear of God. In the light of reason also, it is odd in the highest degree. In any case, only as a consequence of this way of thinking have the philosophers gotten into difficulties with respect to the concept of retribution. In my view, there is no punishment except for the benefit of the sinner, for his education. I mean by this: since the source of sin is ignorance of good and bad, by the connection of the punishment with the sin the understanding one knows that it has

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211 Ger.: nach Bestimmung. Heb.: לְזָרֵעַ.
212 Ger.: nach ihrer Denkungsart. Heb.: בְּרָוחַ.
215 Psalm 76:6 (in accordance with Mendelssohn’s translation). {LS}
216 See Seele 230.35ff., above. {LS}
217 Ger.: Vorherwissen. Heb.: ידיעת.
218 Ger.: Vergeltung. Heb.: גְּזָמֶן.
219 Ger.: die rächende Strafe. Heb.: הנקמה הפשם.
220 Cf. Phàdon Anhang 3 157.36–158.1; further, Gegenbetrachtungen über Bonnets Palingenesie, JA VII 73, as well as GS II 429 and V 310. {LS}
rejected the good and chosen the bad; and this is the purpose of the punishment. However, sometimes one is punished for the education of others, so that they commit no act of the sort that the one being punished has committed. But these two aims are both just; divine governance cares enough to combine a thousand different aims in one act.

Perhaps the human judge is too powerless to achieve both aims, and that is why he punishes the one who sins so that he might obey and fear others. But God, the just judge, does not infringe on the right of the individual for the benefit of the collectivity, as a human ruler does; for all his ways are justice and all his doings are irreprouvable vis-à-vis each and every individual; he never punishes a sinner except for the benefit of that sinner and for the benefit of the collectivity. Were this sinner to know the consequences of the punishment and the true happiness that he gains through this punishment, truly, he would implore God, the all-just judge, to inflict his punishment; for punishment heals the sickness of the soul and binds up its wounds. Without it, the soul cannot convalesce, unless in a miraculous, supernatural way. Considered in this way, the consequences of justice are not evil, but only goodness for the world, for the individuals in it, and for the whole. That is why the complaints of sinners who have to undergo disciplining from God must be completely silenced; for, as we said, the punishment is medicine and healing for the sinner, not vengeance toward him.

You will say that it might be possible for someone to complain: “Why was it decided about Reuben that he sinned and had to suffer for his own benefit, and about Simon that he did not sin at all? Is God, he who is elevated above all imperfection, not thereby acting unjustly? Why is it not decided about all human beings that they are perfectly just, so that there would be no place at all for the punishment of sinners?”

See, we have distanced ourselves from the problem that concerned us with respect to free will, from predestination or foreknowledge, and have come to another question—namely, to the question: Why is there a distinction of rank among creatures? If you ask, “Why aren’t all human beings perfectly just?” then descend further and ask: “Why aren’t stones living beings?” Or ascend: “Why aren’t all human beings angels?” —In my view, one does not need to dwell on this any longer; for this question is obviously absurd and the answer familiar to every beginner: the world is impossible without distinction of rank.

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221 It was in this sense that Mendelssohn expressed himself conversationally to Hennings: “When God punishes, it happens only to improve and to lead back to the way of virtue. Human punishments cannot always be so just. They look to the example as much as to the disciplining, and exclusively to the former when it comes to capital punishments” (cited in Kayserling, Moses Mendelssohn: Sein Leben und sein Werk [Leipzig, 1862], 443–44). {LS}


223 Lit.: right. Ger.: Recht (as earlier in this sentence). Heb.: משפט.

224 Ger.: sein Tun. Heb.: עשה.

225 Ger.: auf wunderbare, übernatürliche Weise. Heb.: והطبيع התולדות מדרכי ומעלה נסי דרך על.


228 Cf. Leibniz, Theodicée §§14 and 31 [Hug 130–31, 141–42]. {LS}