The Myth of Democratic Failure

Acknowledgments
1: Introduction: The Market Metaphor
2: The Informed Voter
3: Electoral-Market Competition and the Control of Opportunistic Behavior
4: Transaction Costs and the Design of Government institutions
5: Homo Economicus versus Homo Psychologicus: Why Cognitive Psychology Does
Not Explain Democratic Politics
6: Legislative Markets and Organization
7: Pressure Groups
8: Bureaucratic Markets: Why Government Bureaucracies Are Efficient and Not
Too Large
9: The Market for Regulation
10: The Constitution as an Optimal Social Contract and the Role of
Transaction Costs in Constitutional Design
11: Majority Rule and Preference Aggregation
12: The Distribution of Economic Wealth and Political Power
13: The Testing of Theory
14: Epilogue: The Burden of Proof
References
Author Index
Subject index