Mathematical Models of Social Evolution

Preface: How to use this book

1 Theoretician’s Laboratory
1.1 Structure of evolutionary theory
1.2 The utility of simple models
1.3 Why not just simulate?
1.4 A model of viability selection
1.5 Determining long-term consequences
1.6 Non-genetic replication

2 Animal Conflict
2.1 The Hawk-Dove game
2.2 Retaliation
2.3 Continuous stable strategies
2.4 Ownership
2.5 Resource holding power
2.6 Sequential play

3 Altruism & Inclusive Fitness
3.1 The prisoner’s dilemma
3.2 Positive assortment
3.3 Common descent and inclusive fitness
3.4 Rediscovering Hamilton’s rule
3.5 Justifying Hamilton’s rule
3.6 Using Hamilton’s rule

4 Reciprocity
4.1 The Axelrod-Hamilton model
4.2 Mutants and mistakes
4.3 Partner Choice
4.4 Indirect Reciprocity
4.5 Reciprocity & Collective Action

5 Animal Communication
5.1 Costly signaling theory
5.2 Cheap honest signals
5.3 Signaling and altruism
5.4 Social learning

6 Selection Among Groups
6.1 Three views of selection
6.2 Deriving the Price equation
6.3 Selection within & between groups
6.4 Dispersal

7 Sex Allocation
7.1 Fisher’s theory of sex allocation
7.2 Reproductive value & sex ratio
7.3 Using the Shaw-Mohler Theorem
7.4 Biased sex ratios
7.5 Breaking the Eigen Barrier

8 Sexual Selection
8.1 Quantitative genetic models
8.2 Fisher’s runaway process
8.3 Costly choice & sensory bias
8.4 Good genes and sexy sons 

A Facts About Derivatives
B Facts About Random Variables
C Binomial Expectations
D Numerical Solution
E Solutions to Problems
 
Bibliography
Index